Caso Natura Harbard Essay

9-807-029 REV: AUGUST 29, 2007 GEOFFREY JONES RICARDO REISEN DE PINHO Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil Beliefs create strong bonds throughout the whole value chain. — Luiz Seabra, Natura’s Founder and Chairman It was an unusually mild fall day in October of 2005 as Luiz Seabra, Guilherme Leal, and Pedro Passos, the three men responsible for founding and growing the Brazilian company Natura, walked through Red Square in Moscow. They were headed to a nearby business center to monitor focus group discussions designed to help them decide if Natura, the largest direct sales beauty company in Brazil, should invest in Russia.

Natura had come a long way since it was founded by Seabra as a small store in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1969. Although sales outside Brazil still constituted only 3% of its total revenues, Natura had grown its international operations in recent years. The company had recently established a new direct-selling operation in Mexico, and Venezuela and Colombia were likely to join Natura’s portfolio in coming years. The company had just opened a flagship store in Paris, the very heart of global fashion and home to L’Oreal, the world’s largest beauty company, and was actively seeking other growth opportunities worldwide.

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Natura’s international development was met with mixed reviews from industry analysts and investment bankers. Some perceived the development as blind ambition on the part of the company’s founders, while others viewed it as a carefully thought-out growth strategy. Even among Natura’s senior executives there were differences in opinion on the optimal business model or regions for expansion. Possibilities for growth included moving to Internet sales, selling products in duty-free shops in airports, and creating retail chains in certain countries.

The executives were strongly inclined to keep international investments relatively low until a final decision was made. In 2005, after an initial public offering (IPO) the previous year, Natura had become Brazil’s biggest domestic cosmetics company, with expected gross revenues of around US$1. 5 billion. 1 Natura, considered one of the best brands in Brazil, was a leading company in the sustainable use of Brazil’s biodiversitya and was known as one of that country’s best employers. However, Seabra, Leal, and Passos knew that their proven ability to face global competitors in their own market was no longer The term “biodiversity” as used in this case refers to the diverse plant life found in Brazil. In general terms, biodiversity is defined as the variety of life in all its forms, levels, and combinations in a given habitat. It also includes ecosystem diversity, species diversity, and genetic diversity. ____________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ Professor Geoffrey Jones and Senior Researcher Ricardo Reisen de Pinho of the Latin America Research Center prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion.

Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2006, 2007 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-5457685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www. hbsp. harvard. edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. 07-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil enough. The rapid consolidation of the global beauty industry was forcing smaller companies to be even more aggressive in developing new product lines, segmenting existing markets, and challenging the previously strong borders between the mass and prestige sectors. However, despite the well-dressed Russian women walking past them in Red Square, the three founders wondered what this country would have in common with their home market, known for its luxuriant Amazon Forest, warm tropical beaches, and an ethnically and culturally diverse population. Beginning with its Cyrillic alphabet, almost everything was initially beyond our understanding,” Leal remembered. As they approached the door to the business center, many thoughts crossed the minds of the Brazilians. Natura, they felt, was a unique company with a growing vision for humanity. Would globalization facilitate the achievement of this vision or prove the ultimate undoing of the company? Was the company ready to build a global business? Was Russia a step too far? The Brazilian Beauty Market Regardless of culture, geographical location, or era, beauty had always created significant economic and social advantages.

Economists agreed that there was a beauty premium: physical attractiveness, which could be enhanced by products of the beauty industry, appeared to exercise a major impact on individual lifestyles, ranging from the ability to attract sexual partners to lifelong career opportunities and earnings. 2 The modern beauty industry was established during the late nineteenth century, as social attitudes toward the use of cosmetics became more favorable and as branding strategies and mass production began to be applied to the former craft industry. In 2004, beauty was a US$231 billion global business, with compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) close to 5% since 1999. 4 It appeared largely recession-proof. This growth had been driven by aging baby boomers in Western countries with higher amounts of disposable income and growing middle classes in developing countries such as Brazil (see Exhibit 1 for sales of cosmetics and toiletries by major markets). Preteen girls, metrosexuals, and seniors all offered huge future growth potential.

Brazil was the fifth-largest country in the world in terms of area and as of 2005 held 20% of the planet’s biodiversity, mainly located in the Amazon region in the northern part of the country. 5 It had a total population of 180 million and gross domestic product (GDP) that ranked 10th in the world. 6 Approximately 80% of its population lived within 350 kilometers of the coast, with the majority of its 47 million households (83% of the population) located in urban areas. The diverse Brazilian population resulted from the Native American, Portuguese, and African groups (the country’s original inhabitants, colonizers, and slaves, respectively) and massive immigrant waves of job-seeking Europeans and Asians during Brazil’s industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century. 8 Due in part to liberal attitudes toward interracial marriage, these different groups gradually created a Brazilian melting pot of ethnic origins and cultures. A 2003 survey found that the Brazilian population was 51. 4% Caucasian, 48% Afro-Brazilian, and 0. 6% Asian and indigenous. However, opportunity was not color blind. Brazil suffered from high rates of income inequality that had deep historical and regional roots. With the income share of the richest 20% of the population equal to 33 times the corresponding share of the poorest 20%, Brazil had one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. According to a World Bank report, approximately 2 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 12% of income inequality in Brazil was attributed to skin color, while the same figure for the United States was 2. 4%. 10 In Brazil, the lighter a person’s skin, the richer they were likely to become.

Brazilian Market Main Trends According to a 2005 Euromonitor survey, the Brazilian beauty industry’s total sales soared from 12. 9 billion Brazilian reais (R$) in 1999 to R$28. 5 billion in 2004,11 easily outpacing the growth rate of the country’s GDP. The total sales of cosmetics and personal-care products in Brazil were relatively high (see Exhibit 2). Brazil ranked third worldwide in deodorants and hair-care products, fourth in perfumery, and sixth in personal-care products for men. 12 Brazil’s rapidly growing population included an increasing number of women working outside the home.

By 2004 females made up 22% of the workforce. Some surveys showed that working women spent around 60% more on beauty products than nonworking women. 13 The average salary for women had also grown substantially relative to the average salary for men, from 59% in 1993 to 70% in 2004. 14 Demographic and social trends were converging with those of developed countries. Divorce rates increased almost 300% between 1984 and 2002. 15 The cultural importance of self-image in Brazil helped boost pharmaceutical sales of products and services that enhanced attractiveness and self-confidence.

In 2004, Brazil was reported as the secondbiggest market for Botox and Viagra and the fourth for Roacutan, a popular anti-acne drug. 16 In 2000, Brazil had the largest number of per capita plastic surgeries in the world, with 207 operations per 100,000 inhabitants, up from 40 in 1990; in comparison, there were 185 plastic surgeries per 100,000 people in the United States. 17 Whereas in the United Kingdom 80% of all plastic surgery was reconstructive, in Brazil 80% of all plastic surgery was cosmetic. 8 Finally, Brazil’s wide range of women’s and men’s beauty magazines had increasingly influenced the development of the cosmetics and toiletries market in recent years. 19 Carnival and the general sensuality that seemed to permeate Brazilian culture often gave foreign observers the impression that Brazil was unusually permissive and liberated, especially compared with other predominantly Roman Catholic nations. “Brazil is a country of contradictions, as much in relation to sexuality as anything else,” observed one anthropologist. “There is a certain spirit of transgression in daily life, but there is also a lot of moralism. 20 One Natura executive noted, “You see women wearing small bikinis at Brazilian beaches, for instance, but you will never see one topless or bottomless as in France, Spain, or Greece. ” Natura Natura was established in 1969 by Antonio Luiz da Cunha Seabra as a small laboratory and cosmetics store in the city of Sao Paulo. Seabra came from a humble background and was not able to attend university until the age of 25, after the birth of two children. After a period of experimentation, the company opted to follow Avon’s path and adopted a direct-selling model in 1974.

Avon was the world’s leading direct seller in beauty products and had successfully operated in Brazil since the 1960s. The door-to-door distribution system allowed Natura to expand at low marginal cost even during economically adverse periods. In 1979, Guilherme Leal, an administrator by training who had acted as a consultant to Natura and had opened a distribution company in the south of the country to sell its products, joined the company. In 1983, Pedro Passos, Leal’s colleague, who had worked with him at a state-owned railway company, was also invited to participate in Natura.

Leal remembered their early years: 3 807-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil In a certain way we were an idea looking for a conduit. None of us had previous experience in the cosmetic industry or even a background that would naturally lead us in this direction. We all started our own production or distribution companies or worked as consultants to each other by a series of coincidences and opportunities. At a certain point we realized we were three people with different styles and experiences who shared the same ideals in terms of our role as individuals and as a company, as part of something bigger.

The 1980s were known in Brazil as the “lost decade,” explained Passos: Brazil experienced rampant inflation and low growth rates. However, it was also a period of many opportunities for a company such as Natura. International players left the country or halted their investments while we saw a lot of women, the primary source of Natura’s workforce, eager to enter the market. Without close competition and with our ability to quickly expand our sales network, we experienced a 43% CAGR between 1979 and 1989. Following this strong expansion in Brazil, we decided to also invest in a few select countries in South America.

But without focus, planning, resources, and the knowledge where we needed it, they were either a downright failure or showed unimpressive results. In 1989, Seabra, Leal, and Passos bought out the other Natura partners’ shares and consolidated the companies that made up the initial Natura system into a single company, Natura Cosmeticos. At the beginning of the 1990s, the company defined its beliefs and values, formalizing them among its stakeholders. In 1994, Natura decided to pursue a new international business and opened an operation in Argentina.

In 2000, it launched the Ekos line, a landmark product line made from raw material from Brazilian biodiversity sources gathered through sustainable methods. Seabra had originally envisioned such a product when the firm was founded, but it had taken over three decades to bring the concept to fruition. Finally, in 2004, Natura floated approximately 25% of its shares in a massively oversubscribed IPO at the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange’s “Novo Mercado,”21 with 70% of the interest coming from outside Brazil. 22 (See Exhibit 3 for Natura’s timeline. ) Product Lines and Brand

Natura sold premium, high-margin cosmetics and personal-care products to middle- and upperclass customer segments in Brazil. The brand was present in all main categories of the cosmetics market but was most prominent in fragrances and perfumes, creams, lotions, and makeup. In 2005, its portfolio contained approximately 600 products23 aggregated into seven main product lines, with three of them—Ekos, Chronos and Mamae e Bebe—considered to be conceptual (see Exhibit 4 for Natura’s main line of products). Continuous reinventing and reformulating of its product portfolio was crucial to Natura’s marketing strategy.

Between 2001 and 2005, the company launched or improved an average of 153 products per year, reinvesting approximately 2. 9% (US$29 million) of its annual net revenues in the company, which was a fraction in absolute terms when compared with reinvestments by its larger competitors. In 2005, L’Oreal spent US$587 million on research and development (R&D),24 while Shiseido invested approximately US$156 million. 25 To continuously innovate and develop products in-house, Natura acquired patents and technology from universities and research centers in Brazil and abroad.

The timeline for the creation and commercialization of a new product ranged from six months to five years, depending on the degree of innovation. Alessandro Carlucci, who became Natura’s CEO in 2005 at the age of 40 after 15 years with the company, elaborated: 4 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 Our innovation process and product launch have been a mix of brainstorming sessions, where the three founders still have a crucial role in defining the concepts behind new products, and a feedback [process] encompassing our sales network and customers.

This dynamic allows us to promptly respond to consumer tastes, support the sales efforts, and promote our brand. We take care of all details. Even the packaging design of our products tries to reflect the attractiveness and positive impact of our values. One industry analyst said: “Natura’s products are aspirational. You can give a Natura product nicely wrapped in a stylish natural fiber bag to a friend or colleague as a present or a gift and you will look good, but generally speaking you wouldn’t dare to do the same with another brand. 26 Natura focused particular research efforts on skincare products and on the sustainable use of ingredients from Brazil’s biodiversity, launching product lines such as Chronos and Ekos. Leal stated: Brazil has a disproportionate amount of the world’s biodiversity, presenting business opportunities in several sectors such as pharmacology, food, and cosmetics. However, we cannot just take the best from the world’s natural resources and from traditional knowledge and put it in a nice packaging. This is the way of the old-fashioned global products.

Therefore, we have to ensure that extraction of any raw material is economically feasible, environmentally correct, and socially just for the protection and progress of communities we want to deal with. Natura sourced some raw materials from the Iratatpuru community deep in the Amazon. The price of raw materials aimed to cover the costs incurred by the supplier while paying a 15% fair trade premium. Because a cosmetic product’s life cycle was usually short, it was important that the suppliers received support in structuring themselves socially and economically to minimize the impact of periods when raw materials were in low demand.

Partnerships with NGOs and the attainment of international certifications were also important for successful sustainability and dissemination. 27 Leal elaborated: On the consumer’s end, Natura’s products are based on the “well-being/being well” concept, which refers to the harmonious, pleasant relationship between oneself and one’s body, combined with the concept of rewarding, empathetic relationships with others and with nature. Natura believes this overall approach has contributed to strengthening relationships along the value chain and has been a key differentiation actor for its products. In 1999, Natura acquired Flora Medicinal, a phytotherapeutic product manufacturer, with the aim of developing complementary product lines such as herbal teas and vitamin pills and of boosting Natura’s research on raw materials gathered from Brazilian biodiversity. However, legal impediments made Natura unable to sell Flora’s products through its direct-sales distribution channel, forcing the company to slow its investments and rethink its strategy.

In 2003, a study that focused on the image of Natura’s brand vis-a-vis those of its main competitors ranked the company as the leading brand in the Brazilian cosmetic market. (See Exhibit 5a for selected brand attributes and Exhibit 5b for Natura’s positioning. ) In a 2005 Morgan Stanley survey, 100% of the interviewees were aware of Natura’s brand, 86% had tried its products, and 63% were regular clients. In addition, 63% had a Natura sales representative, and 21% knew how to reach one if they desired. 28 5 807-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil

Operations Natura’s main operations were concentrated in its exquisite “Espaco Natura” facility, an integrated production, logistics, and R&D center situated in a replanted green area on the outskirts of Sao Paulo. A futuristic construction of concrete and steel, with huge glass windows showing its ample internal open spaces, the building was one of the biggest and most advanced of its kind in Latin America. It consisted of four production units for cosmetics, shampoos, and fragrances; a walkway with a nursery, restaurant, and shop; and a sports compound.

In 2005, Natura had an installed annual manufacturing capacity for 209 million items. Due to the building’s modular characteristics, Natura could expand its manufacturing and storage facilities by up to 370 million items per year without having to substantially increase its storage, conditioning, or distribution capacities. Product manufacturing involved the separation of raw materials, and then the mixture of materials in accordance with the company’s formulas, bottling, and wrapping. The manufacturing of some products, such as soap bars and products containing aerosols, was outsourced to a third party.

The company bought its raw materials from diverse suppliers, many of which had been partners with Natura for over 20 years. In 2005, Natura’s 10 largest suppliers accounted for 43% of total raw material costs, with domestic suppliers responsible for approximately 90% of raw material costs. Packaging costs totaled approximately 44% of the raw material expenses. “Our main international suppliers for fragrances and glass bottles have historically been located in France. This created a strong bond with the country,” stated Seabra.

When an order was placed, the stock management system immediately indicated the stock status to the sales representative. The vertical warehouse then used an automated system that retrieved raw materials and finished products from the shelves and sent manufacturing orders to the production facilities. Within 24 hours orders were automatically checked, packed, and labeled for delivery to the sales representative’s residence. In 2005, Natura received an average of over 40,000 orders per day and shipped approximately 98% of those orders to more than 5,000 municipalities in Brazil.

During peaks in demand, such as Mother’s Day and Christmas, the number of daily orders could increase by almost 60%. To ensure timely delivery of its products, Natura used 26 different delivery companies as well as the Brazilian postal service to transport products to its representatives. Delivery time varied from one to two days in the city of Sao Paulo and from five to six days for more remote locations. Sales and Distribution In 2005, Natura’s products were distributed through a nationwide network of 483,000 active sales representatives in Brazil and 36,000 agents in other countries.

Its sales representatives, known as Natura consultants, were well-trained autonomous female salespeople with no exclusivity contract with Natura. (A few men held senior management posts. ) The sales force included mainly middleclass housewives selling to their friends, independent professionals, secretaries and staff personnel at all kinds of companies leveraging their in-company contacts, and maids selling to colleagues or employers. With no direct remuneration and no work attachment, this model allowed the company to expand without having to assume debt or hurt profit margins. However, due to the nature of our open relationship with our sales representatives,” stated Natura CEO Carlucci, “we believe that approximately 30% of our sales force also sells products from some of our competitors. ” Carlucci went on to describe Natura’s sales process and structure: 6 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 Our selling network is composed of market managers, sales managers, sales promoters, and sales representatives structured in hubs and knots covering specific geographic regions.

They work in a three-week cycle, which we considerer long enough to keep the machine pumping but sufficiently short for clients to remember you. In each cycle, 1,260,000 copies of the Revista Natura catalogue presenting all products on sale and the promotional offers are printed, and each consultant receives at least one copy. The catalogues contain end-consumer reference prices for each product, which normally incorporate a 30% margin.

This margin, combined with premium prices, assures the highest commissions in the industry and strengthens the loyalty of our sales force. Although catalogue-based retailing was practically nonexistent in Brazil, Natura’s catalogues became an important sales tool, and frequent updates provided the consultants with a reason to pay repeated visits to their clients. Natura consultants had an average of 20 to 30 clients, which meant that Natura’s products were seen by 7 million potential consumers every three weeks. It’s important to note that although approximately 30% of total orders come via the Web and are around 80% cheaper to process than those through the call center, we seldom accept purchases from end users to avoid a conflict of interest with our sales network,” stated Passos. Natura’s focus on sales allowed consultants to place orders at any time and to place more than one order within the same cycle, with the company adapting its logistics and distribution arrangements and costs to this end.

Avon’s representatives could only place an order at a specific moment in the cycle, in such a way that all the logistics and distribution processes could be planned and optimized in advance, potentially hampering its sales process and making the process somewhat inflexible. 29 In 2005, Natura’s sales productivity was almost twice the average direct-selling market performance in Brazil. “The direct-selling business model is the core of Natura’s DNA,” stated Leal. Natura’s Leadership Model The Natura leadership team was frequently described as the soul, head, and body of one living being.

Seabra was considered the “soul” of the company. Having founded Natura at the age of 27, he had developed a passion for cosmetics over the years. Although he never formally studied philosophy, Seabra was deeply influenced by Greek philosophers. He was a soft-spoken man with an enigmatic face who resembled a beatific Buddhist monk. He had been the person responsible for providing inspiration and insights to the company. He was perceived as the company icon, bringing an emotional and holistic approach to all levels of the organization.

Seabra summarized some of his thoughts about the industry: Beauty, what a wonderful and dangerous word! We believe that through the formulas, the touch, and the intimacy that cosmetics allow you to have with your own body, one can develop a better perspective about oneself, communities, and nature as a whole. It can be a way for people to express their emotions, their feelings, and a growing concern about the Earth’s preservation and their quest for a harmonious development of human potential.

However, the industry has overpromised things to the customers, especially exaggerating aging and death fears. Moreover, we believe that there is a gap between the beauty stereotypes sold by the industry and the idea of beauty as something connected with being well with your body and soul. In an increasingly transcultural and multiethnic world, people want science and technology to be controlled so that human health and the environment are respected and preserved. 7 807-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil

Seabra became increasingly convinced that the fragmented world needed to discover a new way of thinking, based on a holistic view of life and the idea of “trying to share in a proper way. ” The mission of Natura and its consultants was to explore and share this vision. He described the use of manipulative advertising in the cosmetics industry as a “cultural crime. ” He sought, instead, to help people find the inner beauty within themselves. Leal was portrayed as Natura’s “head”: the straightforward man with a visionary touch who was constantly challenging and stretching Natura’s structure.

He had overseen strategic issues and led initiatives on the internationalization process, the search for new potential partners and products, the engagement in social endeavors, and the idea that a long-lasting relationship with all stakeholders was fundamental to sustainable success. Leal elaborated: We believe that our principles and vision have been important in the development of our company and in the development of our strong reputation in 36 years of operations in the Brazilian market.

We believe that our distinct principles and vision help us attract and retain our extensive network of independent sales representatives and promote a corporate culture that produces innovative marketing concepts and products. Through our business practices, the quality of our products and the relationships we establish, we seek to make Natura a brand ultimately recognized worldwide and identified with a community of people who are committed to creating a better world.

In addition, we believe these principles and vision increase the attractiveness of our products among consumers and will be important as we expand our operations in other geographic markets. 30 Passos represented Natura’s “body. ” Pragmatic and down-to-earth, Passos joined Natura in 1983 as a plant manager, in charge of structuring the company and creating a high-quality standard, and was promoted to CEO in 1998. In 2005 he stepped down as CEO and joined the board of directors.

He commented on the decision process among the three founders and its effects across the organization: We have known each other for a very long time, and therefore our strengths and weaknesses as well as expertise and capabilities are transparent. Not surprisingly, we often disagree openly, which leads us to an impasse. However, through a series of formal and informal meetings and committees in which we tend to include as many executives and as many daring opinions as possible, we seek consensus. Through this mechanism, we centralize the decision process across all business units, aligning the whole company and making all of our key mployees responsible for deciding if issues are consistent with our values. The three founders closely monitored new products and brands to ensure that they were fully consistent with the overall vision of the company, and they were prepared to wait to launch a product until they felt completely confident that it was in sync with the company’s mission. For example, starting in the mid-1980s, market research revealed that there was demand for a product line for babies. However, the founders were not happy with any of the proposals that they had received over the years.

On April 25, 1992, Seabra suddenly had a vision: I was reading a newspaper when I saw a small item reporting research at the University of Miami in Florida showing that little babies given massage slept better, had a better sense of balance, and gained weight. When I read that small item, I thought that it would be best if a mother knew how to massage herself before she massaged her baby. It came to me that a brand should be about the bond between a mother and her baby. When I arrived at the office everyone was completely moved. Within two days someone was sent to the United States to learn more about the research.

Remarkably, that very day was the birthday of my deceased 8 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 mother. It’s as if she had spoken to me about the quality of the bond between mother and child. The highly successful Mamae e Bebe product line was launched in 1994. Natura’s Culture and Corporate Sustainability The result of these different styles and mind-sets was an organizational culture characterized by its openness, transparency, and respect for its stakeholders. Middle management was constantly challenged and empowered to assume new projects and loftier goals.

New talents were developed inhouse or hired from the outside, creating a diversified group of managers. However, this had not always been the case, remembered Carlucci: We understand Natura as being two companies within one. The first is the industrial part, responsible for production and brand. The second is the commercial part, tackling issues such as relationships, marketing, and distribution channels. Until a few years ago they were almost separate entities in terms of career development, with very few executives migrating from one side to the other. With a new concept of leadership, this type of migration is becoming more common.

Natura’s marketing philosophy was that behind each product, there would be a concept capturing the emotions, feelings, and aspirations of its customers. However, instead of molding a product to market demands, Natura sold its beliefs to customers. Philippe Pommez, Natura’s international vice president, explained: “When we develop a new market we first move ideas, then the brand, and finally the product. The company identified 11 attributes for Natura’s brand and evaluates them each time it decides to enter a new market. Our challenge is therefore to enhance specific attributes when they are poor in specific regions or countries. Another important feature of the company was the perception that its success was a consequence of its ability to intimately connect universal values to some perceived Brazilian characteristics, as described by Seabra and Leal: Brazilians are generally depicted as a cordial, generous, joyful, and open people. In some places, innovation and the capability to solve problems are linked with the country. In Latin America, for instance, Brazil is perceived as big, powerful, and different. However, the old stereotype of Brazil being comprised of soccer, samba, and naked women is still vivid in many minds and souls.

These sometimes contradictory perceptions bring some tensions and questions of how to sell the positive attributes or how to express the true sense of “Brazilianity. ” This is important because although we think of ourselves more and more as part of the global environment, we are Brazilians. Carlucci elaborated on the results achieved through this model: By truly living by these values and through the stringent implementation of these concepts, Natura became Brazil’s most admired socially responsible company and owned the third-most valuable brand in Brazil in 2004.

Concurrently, our revenues went from R$1,168 million in 2001 to an expected R$3,540 million in 2005, with EBITDA [earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization] margins jumping from 17% to 24% in the same period. [See Exhibit 6 for Natura’s financial information. ] 9 807-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil The Growth of Competition During the 1970s and 1980s, the Brazilian market was relatively closed to imports, and competitors were mostly multinational companies who manufactured mass-market products locally.

Unilever, the Anglo-Dutch consumer products company, had begun manufacturing toilet soap in Brazil in 1929, followed by toothpaste, and by the 1980s its Gessy Lever affiliate was one of Brazil’s biggest businesses. 31 However, few other companies, especially U. S. -based firms, had been willing to face the political instability and hyperinflation of Brazil. The relative isolation of the market until the early 1990s had facilitated the growth of firms like Natura, which were developing higher-quality products designed especially for local customers.

However, with the economic stabilization of the 1990s and a broader trend toward globalization, the Brazilian consumer market experienced rapid change. Inflation rates dropped to single digits, which helped strengthen Brazilians’ purchasing power and allowed for the emergence of new consumer groups. According to a 2004 survey by the Brazilian Association for the Personal Hygiene, Perfume and Cosmetics Industry (ABIHPEC), there were approximately 1,258 companies operating in the cosmetics, perfume, and personal-hygiene products market in Brazil. Sixteen had net annual sales of over R$100 million, accounting for 73% of the market. 2 “Scale, globalization and ongoing high investments in marketing and product development are the main drivers for consolidation in the household and personal care,” wrote an analyst from a leading investment bank. 33 The sector’s most important and widely known brands and companies were already participants in Natura’s home market, through either direct sales, franchises, or retail channels, some with a solid position and high reputation. Natura’s most relevant competitor in the direct-sales segment was Avon; with approximately 1 million consultants, the company was Brazil’s direct-sales market leader.

In the retail segment, Natura competed with global consumer products giants including Unilever, Johnson & Johnson, and Procter & Gamble, the latter having strengthened its position after acquiring Gillette and Wella in recent years. The selective retail channel competitors included L’Oreal, Nivea (a Beiersdorf brand), Louis Vuitton, and Chanel. (See Exhibit 7a for main competitors in Brazil and Exhibit 7b for product category leaders in Brazil. ) Market Description The Brazilian cosmetics and toiletries market was one of the largest and most developed in Latin America.

Multinationals and local niche players catered to its complex ethnic, cultural, climatic, and socioeconomic characteristics. These firms generated an increasingly competitive environment that stimulated overall capacity for developing more technologically advanced products and products tailored to the requirements of a broad range of consumers. Product segmentation played a key role in market development, with manufacturers increasingly targeting products by gender, ethnic group, and specific age profiles—mainly teenagers and more mature women—thereby fulfilling all consumer needs and desires.

Among the industry segments, the predominance of the personal-hygiene sector clearly reflected the success of products associated with primary needs that had a low per unit value and a large retail market presence. Given the distribution of Brazilian incomes and the low average disposable income levels, the fact that 36% of cosmetics sales were for products within the more expensive core beauty categories—such as color cosmetics, fragrances, and skin care—indicated their importance to the Brazilian consumer.

Lines developed specifically for the summer season as well as those labeled as “well-being” products proved to be a strong, successful trend in 2003 and 2004. These product development and marketing strategies enabled manufacturers to achieve more effective results by 10 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 tailoring their marketing and advertising campaigns. (See Exhibit 8 for sales of cosmetics and toiletries by sector in Brazil. ) Sales channels in Brazil played an important role in industry dynamics.

Supermarkets/ hypermarkets were the dominant channel, contributing almost 40% of total sales, but were mainly focused on mass-market products. Department stores and discounters played a less important role in Brazil than elsewhere in the world, many of them having failed during the 1980s. Likewise, pharmacies and drugstores, with a 26% share in Western Europe, contributed only 10% to total sales in Brazil. On the other hand, specialists such as O Boticario, the second-largest Brazilian cosmetic company, had a well-established position in Brazil, occupying sixth place in terms of market share.

O Boticario was founded in 1977 and had adopted a franchising model. In 2005, O Boticario had 2,328 stores in Brazil and 59 stores and over 1,000 point of sales in 24 countries, selling product lines that, similar to Natura’s, emphasized the company’s Brazilian roots and a connection with nature. 34 Direct selling, with 27% of all purchases, was a popular and well-developed sales method in Brazil. However, by concentrating almost 55% of sales on the core beauty categories, which represented 36% of the total cosmetic and toiletries market in Brazil, the channel had begun to show signs of exhaustion.

Most consumers already had a sales representative, and the model relied on a push by sales representatives, rather than on impulse buys by consumers. (See Exhibit 9 for sales distribution through retail channels. ) Natura’s International Growth Natura’s global ambitions were born early but took two decades to come to fruition. In 1980, Seabra, who had just bought a small apartment in Manhattan, was walking down 5th Avenue when he was struck not only by the immense competition in the cosmetics market but also by the feeling that “there was a place for Natura in the world. At that time data on the worldwide beauty market did not exist in any systematic way. Seabra and Leal decided to do field research, traveling abroad to explore and understand different markets, trends, and strategies. Visiting countries such as France, Italy, and Greece, they quickly recognized that fragrance was a key product line and shortly thereafter introduced perfume in Brazil, along with new hair, skin-care, and makeup segments. “At that moment we also had an insight that most of our values and beliefs were universal and crossshared among different regions and cultures.

To have a global presence in the long run could be a way to enlarge how the company could change the way people think and act,” said Seabra. In 1982, Natura made its first attempt to go international through an agreement with an outsourced distributor in Chile. Leal recalled Natura’s first international steps: I would say that we were moved by an impulse, without any proper planning or knowledge of the markets. In 1983, we allocated a $100,000 budget and created a special brand, Numina, for a new project and started exporting products to Florida, quickly followed by another small operation in Portugal.

In both cases, people who used to work for Natura or had a personal relationship with us were responsible for the local operations. After a short period we discontinued these operations. It was a financial loss but important as part of the learningcurve process. Natura developed a partnership with a local distributor in Bolivia in 1988, opened an operation in Peru in 1992, and founded a local partnership with a distributor in Argentina in 1994. Natura’s decision to expand internationally coincided with political and macroeconomic changes in Brazil.

After lengthy staggering inflation and low economic growth, the country entered into a stabilization 11 807-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil period. At the same time, other Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were experiencing favorable growth rates and were trying to scale up their commercial ties with Brazil. In addition, a cultural emphasis on beauty and a better understanding of how to use beauty products, propelled by mass advertising, had created a rising uniform trend in beauty concepts and demands in the region.

Latin America, of which Brazil constituted 40%, accounted for roughly 10% of world cosmetic consumption and showed a significant potential for international diversification. Carlucci commented: “However, adaptations to Natura’s business model had to be made in specific countries due to a lack of widespread acceptance or knowledge of direct selling as a mechanism to distribute cosmetics, as well as subtle cultural differences or management problems. Chile, for instance, had a good retail network and a more Western European consumer behavior when compared with other Latin American countries. Carlucci remembered further challenges: We had learned that successful penetration of a new market is a long process and involves building brand equity, quickly developing a sizable network of consultants, managing and promoting their productivity, as well as mastering logistics and distribution. We also have to be prepared to adapt some products in terms of formulas and labels or even launch new product lines for a specific market. All of these require strategy, people, process, money, and fundamentally, commitment. We did not have any of them in the beginning.

Renata Ribeiro, Natura’s director for new market development, explained the company’s main drivers for selecting regions for its international expansion: We are currently covering 10 to 15 actual or potential markets. We have collected detailed data about population; size of the cosmetic, fragrance, and toiletries market; its adherence to the direct-sales model; and regulatory issues, among others. Furthermore, we have extensively visited some of these countries to understand cultural aspects and their attachment to Natura’s values.

None of them have enough weight, on a stand-alone basis, to support or disqualify a certain market. We should ponder the combination of all factors. At the end of the day, to develop a new market is a financial decision, but strongly supported by the triple-bottom-line concept. Natura’s decision-making process combines financial, philosophical, and emotional components envisioning a balanced value creation to shareholders, society, and environment.

Carlucci also had discussions with the three founders about the benefits of including more countries in Natura’s portfolio: In the long run we’ll probably have a global portfolio that will be constantly adjusted to reflect the knowledge acquired or developed in different markets. This will be fundamental to enhance our overall quality and to develop specific product lines focused on particular markets. This will help us create a better balanced portfolio where we can quickly introduce products depending on the local needs, even if some are not 100% aligned with the company proposition, without jeopardizing our global brand awareness.

Cost of capital, another key variable in any growth strategy and even more sensitive for companies operating in emerging markets, was not as much of an issue for Natura as for other companies expanding abroad. Carlucci stated, “Cost of capital is fundamental but not as critical as for other companies operating in and from Brazil. We are a nonleveraged company, with high cash generation and low capital expenditure, mostly towards manufacturing and technology. ” 12 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 The Argentinean Lesson

In 1994 Natura hired a former Natura manager originally from Avon to open its operations in Argentina. However, despite a steady growth in the sales force network and resulting revenues, the results were far from satisfactory. Passos commented: We started our international expansion with people who knew the direct-selling business model quite well, but Natura’s culture was absent. After a while, we realized we had quite different companies with just the products in common. Our value proposition, positioning price, and mix of products were not in accordance with our main practices and guidelines in Brazil.

We knew that we had to fix the problem, but Natura did not have sufficient in-house talents to send abroad while our operation in Brazil was experiencing unprecedented growth rates. In 1999, Carlucci, then a sales director at Natura in Brazil, was sent to Argentina as general manager to restructure the business. It was the first time that Natura sent a senior executive abroad with enough resources and empowerment to work on the brand, values, and beliefs. The company invested in the sales structure, expanding it, strengthening relationships, and keeping a low labor turnover.

Logistics were also improved, and a distribution center was created to better deal with products coming from Brazil that were then locally distributed. Revenues quickly grew around 30% per year. However, in December 2001, Argentina experienced its worst political and economic crisis ever, suffering from a currency devaluation of approximately 40%, which threw the country into a deep recession. Carlucci explained: This crisis immediately created an impasse within the company. How could we increase prices in Argentina without losing face when we were building a brand?

How could we widen our distribution network without compromising the existing one, preserving the close and strong relationship with current resellers and maintaining a high retaining rate? How could we optimize marketing expenditures in order to enhance brand awareness? How could we maintain and disseminate our commitment to the company’s fundamental concepts and values, our backbone to success? When we perceived that all of our main competitors were frantically adjusting prices, trying to avoid risks, we saw an opportunity and decided to move in the opposite direction.

We looked for ways to reduce costs and put ads in the major magazines stating that we would keep our prices steady for the time being and would change them if and when local salaries were adjusted. The idea was to create a kind of social pact involving suppliers, employees, and customers, showing to the Argentinean market that we were there for good and we expected profits in the long run. The strategy paid off. From 2002 to 2005, revenues increased sixfold, and the number of consultants grew from 7,000 to 20,000, with low turnover in the same period. (See Exhibit 10 for Natura’s ads in Argentina. The lessons learned in Argentina were quickly transferred to other South American countries where Natura had opened operations in the early 1990s and where the company was facing similar managerial or positioning problems. Carlucci stated: “In Peru, where we had a more entrepreneurial operation, we started focusing more on brand awareness, and in 2005 we were among the best 10 companies to work for in the country. In Chile and Bolivia we just decided to change the local management or to better monitor our sales distributor there, respectively, making them closer to us. ” 13 807-029

Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil Shopping at the Capital of Beauty In early 2005, Paris was clad in the yellow and green colors of Brazil, celebrating the “Year of Brazil” in France with dozens of cultural and business initiatives. Taking advantage of this overall marketing push, Natura produced intriguing advertisements showing a city divided by the Seine, with the luxuriant Amazon Forest on one side and famous Parisian landmarks, such as the Place Vendome, on the other. In April 2005, Natura opened a two-story flagship store in the elegant neighborhood of St-Germain-des-Pres.

Although Natura was on the same street as L’Occitane and The Body Shop, its “well-being lifestyle proposal” ambiance made it stand out from the others, attracting a wide range of clients. 35 “The decision to open in Paris was both a rational and an emotional move. France has historically been a source of knowledge and raw material for our products as well as a source of inspiration,” recalled Seabra. Leal added, “Although our decision to open a store in Paris raised passionate debate, it has been an opportunity to better understand the company and improve our collective decision process. The stylish but simple Natura store in Paris was designed initially to offer only the Ekos line. Although some small changes in the products’ packaging and size had to be made in order to comply with French regulations or local consumer standards, Natura’s “well-being lifestyle proposal” was kept intact. Natura was betting that its average client would be attracted to the store not only by Natura’s Latin background or a familiarity with the company’s origins but also by the different look of the store and its product offerings. 6 However, more than a point of sale, the store was conceived as a reference. Passos recalled, “More than anything, it became a strong symbol. ” The store could be used as a place where Natura’s beliefs and vision could be displayed. Its second floor functioned as a gathering place, where customers could sample Natura’s products and the company could promote events that evoked Natura’s brand as well as its Brazilian roots. The store’s opening also meant that the company had to adopt a new sales paradigm.

The Paris store marked the first time that the company, previously devoted to the direct-sales model, had opened a retail store. Pommez stated: The French market is not a traditional market for direct selling. However, some research has shown a recent social trend in which people have been looking for more friendship, intimacy, and different ways of enhancing their social contact. Tupperware, for instance, has successfully expanded its operation there. Our aim in France is perhaps to develop and test a model that combines different concepts.

We have to keep in mind that although direct selling is the core of our business, a focus on just one business model or region could drive the company away from promising markets, jeopardizing our efforts to become an international company. Concurrently, the diversification risk is to drain management attention, energy, and resources. With a $20 million budget through 2007 for France, management was also looking for other possibilities, including the introduction of the Internet to sell products to end users. “We believe we have an appealing proposal to Europeans.

France is the place to test different formats since, unlike Germany or the United Kingdom, we face low direct-sales acceptance in the country,” commented Passos. 14 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 The Mexican Hybrid Model Plans for a Mexican operation began developing in 2003 when Natura’s executives assessed that the country’s economy, demographics, and social spectrum, as well as the Mexican passion for cosmetics, were similar to those of the Brazilian market. According to Euromonitor, total Mexican cosmetics and toiletries market sales accounted for $5. billion in 2004. Avon was the third-largest company after Colgate-Palmolive and Procter & Gamble. Avon started its operations in 1956, and its Mexican sales, which included jewelry, toys, and cooking utensils, made Mexico Avon’s secondbiggest market after the U. S. It employed 400,000 salespeople and was one of Mexico’s 50 largest companies. 37 However, if Mexico was considered a good market in terms of distribution channels, it was poor in terms of brand management and would require a different strategy, especially because Natura was a late entrant in the country.

Carlucci elaborated: In terms of our recent international expansion effort, our biggest challenge so far has been how to adapt a very successful “Brazilian model” to other countries without losing our roots and culture. We could say that when we start our Mexican operation in November 2005 it will already be the result of a learning curve developed in other Latin American countries and, more recently, with our flagship store in Paris. Therefore, we opted for a hybrid model that could mix different components and reflected adjustments based on the Paris experience.

Our first initiative there was the creation of the “Natura’s House” concept, a place where our sales representatives could be in touch with the brand, could meet each other and exchange experiences, be trained through speeches and exhibitions, or test our products by receiving a hand massage using Natura’s creams or oils. This has been instrumental in strengthening the relationship. Furthermore, Natura’s House can be seen as a middle ground between a pure direct-selling model and a store chain. It can be replicated in different parts of the biggest towns or regions at a cost that is a fraction of a traditional store.

Natura also decided to introduce several new marketing tools that could help develop brand awareness. A series of small products named “The Icon,” presented in special packages with folders explaining the concept of the brand, were freely distributed to potential sales representatives and customers. Natura would also pioneer the use of its “magalogue” in Mexico, a combination magazine and catalogue, where along with Natura’s products and special offerings there were articles on related health and beauty issues.

In the same manner as in other Latin American countries, Natura planned catalogues and magalogues in Brazil, but final decisions and printing were done locally to avoid cultural clashes and to minimize costs. In addition, the company adapted pricing policies to each country to reflect local income levels. Management was another crucial issue in the operation. Leal stated, “The lack of a professional pool of talent has been a bottleneck in our international strategy. In the early 1990s, for instance, we had just one employee who spoke proper English.

Now this has changed. ” Carlucci recalled: Initially, the general manager in Mexico was a Brazilian with experience from other Natura Latin American operations. However, we hired a Mexican executive with a solid background in direct selling who had been trained in Brazil and will serve as a shadow executive until 2006 when he will replace the Brazilian. Operating in multiple international platforms has forced us to develop local employees able to create the same kind of aspiration and bonds that Natura has in Brazil, but with a local touch. 15 07-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil Mexico could also be used as a platform to enter the attractive American market. In 2005, O Boticario had seven stores and a presence in 26 department stores in Mexico City. An O Boticario executive stated: Mexico became [O Boticario’s] biggest expansion market, [and] it is the door to the U. S. economy. Because there are lots of U. S. companies in Mexico and lots of Mexicans living in the United States who visit their families across the border, our [presence] in Mexico City builds our brand name.

So, if one day we decided to open stores in Texas, we’d already have name recognition there. 38 Natura shared similar views, but with an edge, as elaborated by Leal: “The American West Coast would be an obvious market to go to. Its society is environmentally engaged, and it has the wellbeing concept already entrenched in its culture. However, we believe we need to expand to places where people are looking for something different, places where Natura evokes singular feelings and aspirations. According to Natura’s executives, the expansion of international operations could create logistical problems in the future since Natura’s products were developed, manufactured, and shipped from Brazil to warehouses and distribution centers in each country. Passos explained: This has obliged us to not only manage increasingly small quantities of SKUs [stockkeeping units] in different locations but also to deal with different sizes, labels, ingredients, and regulations. At this stage cost is not a problem, but service is. Therefore, we have thought about alternatives to anticipate solutions and tackle the upcoming problem.

They range from the management of higher local stocks to the possibility of manufacturing some products in proprietary or outsourced plants in other regions. Creating a Global Face In 2005, Natura’s international sales accounted for 3% of consolidated total sales with results still below break-even. “The percentage of revenues generated abroad will be always the result of our efforts abroad and our growth in Brazil, which has a disproportional weight on this equation,” Leal summarized. Another senior executive added, “We have approximately 0. % of the Latin American market share, and we expect to have something between 5% and 10% in 10 years. At the end of the day, we will be always a Brazilian company with several international platforms growing at a fast pace. ” The right business model to be used in these multiple platforms remained a source of debate inside the company. Leal explained: We have to develop a discipline to implement a defined strategy. When we have too many options it is easy to lack focus and energy. Consistency is key, and we have to avoid the temptation of using shortcuts.

In 2005, for instance, we had the opportunity to analyze the acquisition of an important stake in a global company. It had a strong brand and a well-placed network of stores spread out in the main developed markets. However, after many tense internal discussions, we decided to decline it. We thought the combination of two brands and distribution channels wouldn’t be complementary, could jeopardize Natura’s culture and, over time, destroy brand value. A partnership with another international company was also under discussion at that time. “It is not clear to the management that in order to create a global brand it is necessary to have an 16

Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 international partner, even one with strong direct-selling expertise. To preserve our values and beliefs is fundamental, and a new partner will just know to sell its own brand,” stated Seabra. It was the search for new opportunities that had led the three founders to Russia in the fall of 2005. Russia had a $6. 4 billion fast-growing cosmetic and toiletries market. The share of the market held by direct-sales companies had grown from 5. 4% in 1999 to 18. 7% in 2004, encompassing approximately 1. 6 million consultants.

The direct sellers Avon and Swedish-owned Oriflame had recently become the market leaders, ousting both traditional retail competitors such as P&G and L’Oreal and local manufacturers, led by the company Kalina. On the other hand, Russia was still known as a market with strong bureaucratic obstacles, poor legislation in terms of product quality, counterfeiting, and tough competition. 39 Seabra found Moscow, in which the founders had sat for hours in traffic jams, somewhat bewildering, and was disturbed by the apparent materialism of people whose consumption had for so long been subdued.

While observing the focus group discussion behind two-way mirrors, the founders quickly observed that the Russians were not very concerned about environmental sustainability, knew little about Brazil, and knew nothing at all about Natura. Nevertheless, they placed the company’s products alongside well-regarded Russian and international brands in terms of pricing and value perception. While Passos and Leal checked out some figures and projections, Seabra gently smiled as he observed, “Data analysis and metrics will be always important tools, but the emotional touch is fundamental to making a decision. As they walked back to their hotel through Red Square, the three founders had more questions than answers. Russia could be a great opportunity, but was it still too soon for Natura to pursue it? If not Russia, where else should the company look to expand, and what criterion should be used to decide whether or not to invest? Should Natura consider further globalization through acquisition or permit itself to be acquired by an established global player? Or should it try to grow internationally by working with independent entrepreneurs who shared Natura’s values? 17 07-029 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil Exhibit 1 Sales of Cosmetics and Toiletries by Selected Major Market (US$ billions) 2004 Global Sales (%) 19. 7% 13. 3% 6. 1% 5. 4% 5. 0% 4. 2% 3. 6% 3. 0% 2. 8% 2. 3% 2. 0% 1. 4% 0. 6% 0. 6% 0. 6% 0. 7% 28. 7% 100. 0% 1999 Global Sales (%) 22. 9% 15. 1% 5. 2% 5. 3% 5. 0% 4. 0% 2. 8% 2. 2% 2. 0% 2. 4% 1. 8% 1. 4% 1. 5% 0. 8% 0. 7% 0. 6% 26. 3% 100. 0% 2004 Sales United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Brazil China Spain Russia Mexico South Korea India Argentina Philippines Venezuelaa Colombia Others Total Source: 999 Sales 41. 3 27. 3 9. 4 9. 6 9. 1 7. 2 5. 1 4. 0 3. 6 4. 3 3. 3 2. 6 2. 8 1. 5 1. 2 1. 2 47. 2 180. 7 45. 6 30. 7 14. 0 12. 4 11. 6 9. 8 8. 2 6. 9 6. 4 5. 3 4. 7 3. 3 1. 5 1. 5 1. 3 1. 2 66. 5 230. 9 Adapted by casewriter from “The World Market for Cosmetics and Toiletries,” Euromonitor, October 2005, and “Cosmetics and Toiletries in Venezuela,” Euromonitor International, August 15, 2005. aVenezuelan bolivar converted to American dollars by the exchange rate of the last available day of the year. Available at http://www. bankofcanada. ca/en/rates/exchform. tml, accessed April 12, 2006. Exhibit 2 Global per Capitaa Spending on Cosmetics and Toiletries, 2004, in US$ Color Cosmetics 26 27 6 29 3 4 6 2 6 10 1 3 All Cosmetics and Toiletries (CT) 234 195 45 160 39 55 65 28 51 50 6 26 All CT, % of GDP per Capita 0. 7% 0. 5% 1. 1% 0. 4% 1. 0% 1. 7% 1. 2% 1. 4% 0. 8% 1. 2% 0. 5% 1. 0% Fragrance France United Kingdom Russia United States Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela China Thailand 36 19 9 21 5 9 7 4 8 4 0 1 Skin Care 60 29 6 25 5 6 8 4 7 7 2 8 Others 113 120 24 86 26 36 44 18 30 29 3 14 Source:

Adapted by casewriter from Lore Serra and Robert Wertheimer, “Natura: Great Company; suggest waiting for better entry point,” Morgan Stanley, May 24, 2005, available at Investext, accessed November 12, 2005. aPer capita calculation includes total population, men and women. 18 Natura: Global Beauty Made in Brazil 807-029 Exhibit 3 Natura’s Timeline 1969 1974 1979 Natura is founded by Luiz Seabra Introduction of direct-sales system Establishment of the Natura System as a group of several companies Guilherme Leal joins the company Launches its first men’s product line, Sr.

N Brand recognition in Brazil Introduces makeup and fragrances for the first time Starts operations in Chile Pioneering in the launch of products with refills Pedro Passos joins the company Regional and product portfolio expansion Launches Chronos product line, its first generation of anti-signs facial treatment Merger of the companies that integrated the Natura System Introduction of external auditors Natura states its “Reasons for Being and Beliefs” Establishes the Truly Beautiful Women concept, stating that bea


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