Discuss Iran nuclear ambition? Will it become a nuclear weapon state? “The world will need greatly increased energy supply in the next 20 years, especially clean-generated electricity. And nuclear power answers all parameters of future energy needs. ” Jasjit Singh INTRODUCTION On December 3, 2007, the U. S. National Intelligence Council released an unclassified summary of the newest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. Although the assessment states that the US Intelligence Community has “high confidence” that Iran’s “nuclear weapons program” was halted in 2003 and that the halt lasted for “at least several years,” the document makes clear that the halt applied only to one facet of Iran’s activities relevant to the development of nuclear arms. Moreover, other statements in the document, along with extensive evidence in the public domain, suggest that other activities relevant to the possible production of nuclear weapons continue.
There are thus strong reasons for on-going concern about the future direction of Iran’s nuclear activities. These concerns call for continued international pressure on Iran to curtail its work on uranium enrichment and plutonium production — technologies that can produce nuclear explosive material — and to permit more intensive inspections of its nuclear program to ensure it is not used to produce nuclear weapons. IRAN GEOGRAPHYCAL LOCATION Iran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, country in southwestern Asia, located on the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf. One of the world’s most mountainous countries.
For centuries, the region has been the center of the Shia branch of Islam (see Shia Islam). Iran ranks among the world’s leaders in its reserves of oil and natural gas. As is the case in other countries in the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf region, the export of oil has dominated Iran’s economy since the early 20th century. Iran geographic location played an important role through different historical times, as it constitutes the connecting link between the East and the West and it is a natural corridor for international trade between the Far East and the Mediterranean basin, so-called “key to the East. Iran has an important naval coast on the Arabian Gulf, which has great economic importance; these shores have a major role in enhancing the military power of Iran. Iran’s geographical location plays an important role because of the magical and supervision of the Strait of Hormuz and its control over some islands in it. This strait is one of the most important international waterways in which traverse every day more than 100 ships at a rate of one ship every 15 minutes.
Iran is suffering from the border conflicts because of its neighboring countries. Perhaps the most dangerous conflict of the border is between Iraq and Iran. This is a vulnerability factor in the strength of Iran from the perspective of political geography. Iran has a natural wealth in terms of its vast agricultural land and crops, and richness in water, fishery, where the finest types of caviar and fish are produced in the Caspian Sea; not to mention the great mineral wealth in addition to oil.
Iran is situated between two oil-wealthy States is the first (the West), the Arabian Gulf in the west of Iran, which contains the largest reserve of oil in the world (643 billion barrels), and the Caspian Sea to the north, which has also an with an estimated reserve of oil where oil of about 8 – 16 billion barrels. IRAN NUCLEAR BACKGROUND Iran is a member to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and concluded the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. Iran signed the Additional Protocol in 2003, but has not yet ratified it.
Iran started its civilian nuclear energy program with assistance from the United States in the 1970s. Iranian nuclear facilities include an uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, and a heavy water reactor near Arak, both of which were concealed from the IAEA until 2002. In 2003, the IAEA announced that Iran had breached its safeguards agreement by failing to fully declare its nuclear activities. Furthermore, IAEA inspectors found traces of enriched uranium on centrifuges imported from Pakistan. Iran claims the contamination stems from the centrifuges’ earlier use in Pakistan and denies having tested them with uranium.
Suspicions on part of the IAEA and Western states prompted by these clandestine activities are compounded by Iran’s plans to master the nuclear fuel cycle. Iran asserts that its nuclear program is for civilian energy purposes only and continues to cite its inalienable right to pursue peaceful energy under Article IV of the NPT. Many countries suspect that Iran might be misusing Article IV of the NPT to obtain nuclear weapons capabilities and have expressed doubts regarding Iran’s stated need for pursuing sophisticated fuel cycle technologies.
The United States, in particular, have been pushing for Iran’s referral to the United Nations Security Council where Iran might face sanctions for its nuclear program. Urged by IAEA Board of Governors resolutions issued in 2003, Iran is cooperating with the IAEA to allow for the verification of its stated peaceful nuclear program. Iran voluntarily suspended its uranium enrichment activities, and allowed for more intrusive IAEA inspections.
Since the fall of 2004, Iran has also been engaged in renewed negotiations with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (also known as the EU-3), with the prospect of agreeing on a proposal by August 2005. According to an agreement reached in November of 2004, Iran continues to temporarily suspend its enrichment activities, but has repeatedly threatened to resume enrichment if the EU-3 talks remain fruitless. Iran’s Nuclear Program The Iranian nuclear effort, pioneered by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, emerged under the auspices of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program.
On March 5, 1957, the US-Iranian Agreement entitled “Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms” opened the doors for US investment in the fledging Iranian nuclear industry. The United States supplied the newly established Tehran Nuclear Research Center with a five-megawatt reactor and continued to provide Iran with nuclear fuel and equipment for the next 10 years. In the 1970s, Iran also secured assistance from France and Germany. In March 1974, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was established, and the Shah announced the plan to “get, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts [of electricity] from nuclear power stations. (1) Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1, 1968, on the very day it opened for signature, and completed the IAEA Safeguards Agreement six years later. However, by the mid-1970s, after India’s successful nuclear test, the United States started having second thoughts about the Iranian nuclear program. In 1974, under US pressure, France and Germany cancelled their contracts for building nuclear reactors at the Iranian sites in Darkhovin and Bushehr. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the seizure of US hostages, outside assistance effectively ended.
Washington blocked Iran’s subsequent nuclear deals with Argentina, China, and Russia. Opposition to nuclear technology by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1979-89), the flight of nuclear scientists, and the destruction of the immediate threat to Iran – Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor – by Israel in 1981, led to the temporary suspension of Iran’s nuclear efforts. However, Leonard Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, points out that during that time Iran received assistance from Pakistani nuclear scientist A.
Q. Khan. (2) The nuclear program was energetically resumed by Iran’s next spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. (3) Analysts also believe that Iran was prodded by the discovery that confirmed Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program in 1991. Despite international regulations on export of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, outside assistance was not hard to find. In January 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia for two 950-megawatt light-water reactors at Bushehr, for which Russia promised to supply fuel.
Soon afterward, the Darkhovin nuclear project was also resumed. Iran also obtained nuclear technology and assistance from China, Pakistan, and North Korea. With outside support and indigenous efforts, Iran has built a vast network of uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites, and research reactors. One of its largest nuclear sites, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, employs as many as three thousand scientists, contains Iran’s uranium-conversion facilities, and is alleged to house Iran’s weapons program.
Another central site is the Natanz enrichment facility, holding a pilot plant (PFEP) and commercial enrichment plant (FEP). (4) At Natanz, centrifuges purchased from Pakistan increase the percentage of uranium-235, the principal ingredient for both power production and weapons capability. In August 2002, a London-based Iranian opposition group disclosed worrisome details about a secret heavy-water production plant at Arak, as well as the underground enrichment facility at Natanz, which raised serious doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear intentions.
In May 2003, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said he “believe[d] Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons [… ] using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant). ”(5) These revelations, coupled with subsequent admissions from Iran that it has concealed aspects of its program, prompted the IAEA to intensify inspections. International inspectors have never found concrete evidence linking Iran’s nuclear program to weapons development.
However, in June 2003, IAEA inspectors reported that Iran had failed to meet obligations under its Safeguards Agreement signed in 1974. (6) Among other things, Tehran withheld construction and design details of new facilities, and failed to report processed and imported uranium. International pressure led Iran to temporarily cease its enrichment-related activities. In late 2003, Tehran signed an Additional Protocol allowing the atomic agency greater access to nuclear sites. Since then, however, concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities have only increased.
Iran agreed under international pressure in November 2004 to suspend work on uranium enrichment, but in August 2005, Iran’s newly elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, vowed to restart the program. Operations at Natanz were resumed in January 2006. Since then, the Natanz facility has grown substantially, despite the international sanctions imposed under UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. (7) On August 8, 2005, Iran announced it was resuming uranium conversion at its other nuclear site – Isfahan. (8) Today, Iran operates a few thousand IR-1 centrifuges.
The November 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that while Iran likely halted its weapons program in fall 2003, it could produce enough HEU for a weapon within a 2010 to 2015 timeframe. In February 2008, the United States turned over to international inspectors the intelligence that allegedly proved Tehran’s intentions to develop nuclear weapons. The documents describing designs and computer simulations that appeared to be related to weapons work were said to have been smuggled out of Iran on a laptop computer and delivered to the CIA in 2004. 9) Article IV of the NPT provides that every party to the treaty has the right “to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and that “nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II. Iran uses Article IV to support its right to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities. (10) However, Western governments accuse Iran of failing to abide by NPT safeguards and of pursuing technology to produce nuclear weapons. (11) The United States has imposed unilateral economic sanctions on Iran for nearly three decades. (12) In December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted the first of three resolutions imposing multilateral sanctions to punish Iran for continued uranium enrichment.
Resolution 1737 blocked the sale or transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. (13) Subsequent resolutions have added financial and travel restrictions on Iranian individuals and companies. In June 2008, the European Union imposed its own set of sanctions, freezing the assets of nearly forty individuals and entities doing business with Bank Melli, Iran’s largest bank. Negotiating with Iranian leaders has been attempted as well. For example, in 2008, the European Union resubmitted a 2006 offer of incentives for Iran to give up its enrichment activities.
However, the Iranian response to the diplomatic overtures from the West has been mixed. Iranian Nuclear Program Remains A Major Threat In the beginning of 2007, the nuclear technology expansion by the Iran government has obtained major effect from the America, UK, Germany and France. It even made the America, worried especially after the endorsement of the hard liner politician Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad to the Iranian President (end 2005). The America and her main European partners are very excited to stop the Iranian effort to develop the nuclear technology for it peace aims.
Nevertheless, the America and quite prejudicial that Iran would at last change its nuclear technology development into making of a nuclear weapon. The pressure between Iran and Western and also Middle East intensified when the Iranian government decided to reactivate the research over the nuclear development in Natanz (Iran) in early January 2006. This nuclear station had been closed and sealed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for almost four years. Without a doubt, Iran is reconstruction its nuclear infrastructure.
The crucial goal of that programme is debatable. This paper will examine can nuclear development in Iran destabilize regional security, with an eye toward analysing the cause of that nuclear programme toward the security of Middle East, a threat many believe has more direct consequences for the US than the ‘weapon of mass destruction’ threat that the Pentagon is so consumed with. , domestic and international politics, social and economy. This paper could also be as a guide for further and detail information in future for those who interested to do so.
It is giving certain perception and perspective in this field since Iran as one of the dominant powers in Middle East region is developing their capability to be a superpower. So, whatever development emerge in Iran, it will give certain impacts and implications toward the world especially Middle East Region in economic and security matters. Does Iran really have the nuclear capability or it is only the propaganda made by its enemy. It also outlines the reasons for Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
The America has strongly accused the Iran government of violating the declaration signed by IAEA. The blame was aimed to support the America in forcing Russia, China, UK and France, to bring along the Iran nuclear case to the UN Security Council would further consider and decide to end the Iran plan of its uranium enrichment as for the future alternative energy. The America as a great power worries over the Iranian nuclear could be considered ideological resulting from a number of factor that have been fixed for a long time.
Until now Iran has owned nine strategic facilities such as Saghand, Ardkan, Gehine, Isfahan, Natanz, Teheran, Bushehr, Arak and Anarak. Iran nuclear technology sites have been develop progressively. VIEW OUTSIDE IRAN OF NUCLEAR POWER Iran neighbors in particular, Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, Syria, Egypt and other Arab Muslim states try to claim not to worry about a nuclear armed in Iran, some in the region like Egypt, Syria and Libya abandoned their nuclear because of a lack of resources, the possibility of incentive and well founded fear of negative repercussions.
In our view, Iran purchase would not necessarily change their calculations. The Persian Gulf States acknowledge to be more worried that an America government, intent on war with Iran, would drag them into their fourth regional war in generation. Therefore, the America could not easily say Iran to do what they like to. As such there were some factors that culminated in the America pressure regarding differences in ideology. Such pressure was reflect in President George Bush’s statement in his Union speech delivered to America Congress on 29 January 2002 as follows: Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and the allies with weapon and mass destruction…North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapon of mass destruction, while starving its citizen. Iran aggressively pursues these weapon and export terror …Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. What did President Bush mean by declaring the three countries is North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the axis of evil? It seems groundless. President Bush just overstated the issue of the axis of evil in order to fulfill his main political agenda of ‘the war on terror’ after the 9/11 tragedy. The agenda seemed also on the right track in supporting the politic ambition of President Bush close advisers, namely the Neocons (Donald Rumsfeld and others). Actually, it is not quite right for President Bush to place North Korea, Iraq and Iran on the axis of evil.
Historically, after the World War I and II, these countries did not belong to the old axis (Germany, Japan and Italy), where the old axis had been sentenced by the allies through World War II. For Israel, a nuclear armed Iran is a clear and present danger. Israel takes at face value Iran threat to destroy the Jewish state, restore Muslim control of the Holy Places, and back a one states solution an Islamic Palestine in which Jews can live alongside Arabs and Muslims. Most Israeli strategic do not question if Israel should look for to remove Iran nuclear facilities, rather they question when and how.
Israelis see two scenarios both threatening if Iran becomes a nuclear weapon power. The firsts is a domino style arms race in the region whereby other Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt look to obtain their own nuclear weapons. The Second is a greater tendency for Iran to pressure Israel with conventionally armed surrogates or more likely a Lebanese Hezbollah refreshed by thoughts of Iran nuclear umbrella. It show that among Arab Region disagree the nuclear development in Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Muslim states except Syria now is already influences by America in International Relations.
THE SUPPLIERS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN NUCLEAR POWER Iran has look to Russia, China and Pakistan for assistance developing its nuclear capabilities. Although it is debatable whether the governments to these nuclear states knowingly supported Iran ambitions, the Iran program clearly would not be as far along as it is today without some cooperation from them. As far back as 1987, Pakistan reported met with Iran officials and it seems that offered them designs and component for uranium improvement. Through the years, Iran has purchased equipment and component from both Russia and China.
Russia has clearly supported the plutonium reactor at Bushehr and continues to support Iran access to peaceful nuclear energy. The support that this nuclear supplier states have provided Iran underscores their continuing notice in Iran as a customer. In looking at Russian there is both good news and bad. Russian views itself as neither the problem nor the solution. While Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush have jointly stated that Iran should not allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon, Russia continues to provide equipment for Iran nuclear energy program.
Moscow promise, however not to sell nuclear fuel to Iran unless Tehran agrees to return spent fuel to Russian. From Moscow perspective, Iran program represents a major export opportunity for a nuclear industry that has few domestic or international markets. It see Iran as a major political player in the region an Islamic country that has been largely respectful to Russian interests, and a key partner in Central Asia and the Middle East. Russian show more concerned about an America interference that would jeopardize Russian commercial interests, complicate bilateral relation, ncluding those with Israel and the United States, cause further regions destabilization and set off strategic and economic ripples effects that Russia be ill prepared to handle some in Russian view the Iranian nuclear program as mainly aimed at the America and therefore useful in countering increasing America influence and adventurism. At the same time, Russian officials understand that the issue is important for its principal interlocutors the United States, United kingdom, German and France.
Moscow would not want to be cut out of any coordination they propose. PERCEPTION OF NEIGHBORHOOD REGARDING IRAN NUCLER POWER Iran nuclear is achievement is a trigger in the Middle East, among the six Arab states that are member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman, few admit to see a nuclear –armed Iran as a greater threat than Iran without nuclear arms. After all, they have lived with India and Pakistan, both non –signers of the NPT whose nuclear have been aimed at each other.
They reject the argument that Iran with nuclear weapon is a threat, while Israel with its undeclared nuclear weapon is not a threat. The GCC states do not seem to seize the argument of the EU and the IAEA that if Iran were allowed to pursue nuclear weapon technology, then other government would also continue try to obtain nuclear capability, international agreements on arms control would become meaningless and arms control agreement such as the NPT would lose relevance similarly, the issue of risk to Israel is unimportant to them.
On the basis of these assumptions, the question is: what will happen? The most reasonable approach to this question is that Iran will probably use its nuclear capability only as a ‘last choice’, and as a deterrent against the following threats: •Iraq – the main trigger for the Iranian military build up was its defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. •The US threat – the nuclear capability will not be used aggressively against the US, but rather for deterrent purposes – to deter US attack. The Russian threat – in this context, the nuclear capability would also be used only as a deterrent; •Israel – Iran is concerned that Israel will attack, but not with nuclear weapons. If a nuclear armed Iran is not, strictly speaking, a Gulf issue, the GCC states do not see it as option they must anticipate or help resolve. If the US or Israel see the threat as serious, they say, then those states should take care of it.
Most Gulf Arab seem to prefer let the US and Israel resolve the Iran problem, but they also know that if a military option is pursued, then their region would be in crisis and they would have to deal with the consequences. They blame the US and Iran equally for the lack of regional security, and they condemn the absence of direct contact between Tehran and Washington. In their opinion, this lack of dialogue will ultimately lead to a military confrontation. They see Iran as determined to pursue nuclear weapon at any cost, and some even believe Iran has made its decision to pursue nuclear weapons and is at the point of no return.
Gulf Arab leader say they are more worried that the US is resolute to pursue military confrontation with Iran, which would create an increasing danger to their security and well being. They worry about the risk of a region wide war between the US. INSPECTION EXPOSED OF IRAN NUCLER POWER The IAEA released a rather a typical report at June 2003 Board of Governors meeting: Implementation of the NPT safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/40.
While the report generally on the status of safeguards agreements, and report in detail for countries like Iraq or North Korea which are in noncompliance, the report exposed significant detail of Iran program that might in the past have been considered to be safeguards confidential information. However, that issues needed to be resolved as soon as possible, that Iran should cooperate and demonstrate full transparency, and that safeguards need to be more strongly implemented, even failures of reporting that previously might have been overlooked.
The IAEA report identified three major areas of concern for implementing nuclear safeguards, Iran failure to report uranium imported from China in 1991, centrifuge enrichment program and about the heavy water program. Although the kind and amounts of uranium imported without any declarations are insignificant for use in a nuclear weapon, Iran was technically incorrect in assuming that because the quantities did not exceed one effective kilogram that it did not have to place it under safeguards. The real problem is that such material was used to experiment with processes that are relevant for nuclear weapons development.
The most serious question about the centrifuge enrichment program relate to whether Iran would have proceeded with the production of centrifuge equipment and construction of facilities, particularly the commercial –scale plant, without fully testing the centrifuge equipment with uranium hexafluoride (UF6) process gas. Some observers believe that centrifuge assemblies can be tested sufficiently with other gases other believe that the huge speculation in equipment would need testing with nuclear material. The heavy water program poses a large question mark about Iranian intentions.
The NCR indicated that Iran had a production plant for heavy water at Arak. Iran reportedly told the IAEA initially that it planned to produce heavy water at Arak for export, but in May 2003, it told the Agency it planned to build a research reactor for research and development, radioisotope production, and training that would use heavy water as a coolant and moderator. The heavy water production plant is not subject to safeguards. CONCLUSION What comes next? Since Ahmadinejad took office, Iran has reversed key decisions of his predecessors to suspend uranium enrichment work at Natanz and to expand IAEA inspection rights.
Will he also oppose continuing the halt on weaponization work? With the IAEA restricted and the United States, according to a senior Israeli official, having lost its crucial source of information on the weaponization effort, he may well believe these activities can be restarted without detection.  The scenario of greatest concern at the moment is that once Iran is able to produce quantities of low-enriched uranium, it will build a stockpile of the material and, if it has not done so by this point, finish designing the bomb and building its on-nuclear components. It would then be in a position to withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did in January 2003) and then upgrade its stocks of enriched uranium to weapons grade and fabricate complete nuclear weapons, steps that might be completed in a matter of months. With the NIE indicating that Iran could have the necessary weapons material sometime between 2010 and 2015, the threat of such a “break out” may not be a distant one.
The danger of a nuclear armed Iran thus remains very real indeed. The United States, its partners on the UN Security Council, and others, such as Germany and the EU, who have played leading roles in the attempt to constrain Iran’s nuclear capabilities have every reason to sustain their efforts and must do so, in particular, by taking the next step in the process: imposing a third round of sanctions on Iran, while holding out the possibility of negotiations to ease the current impasse.
Ahmadinejad’s hardline cohorts face parliamentary elections early in 2008 and, as international economic sanctions have intensified, his intransigence on Iran’s nuclear program has been the subject of growing domestic opposition. The international community needs to maintain pressure on Iran to change course and must not be deflected by taking greater comfort from the NIE than it actually provides. Middle East countries including the government of Iran, believe that the Iran nuclear development should be better established through diplomatic forum.
However, it is necessary for Ahmadinedjad (Iran) to be able to convince the America specially Israel that the Iran nuclear development is indeed for peaceful objective, and it is not just symbolic promise. Iran should also learn from the Iraq case, where President Bush disobeyed the international community resolution in rejecting the Iraq war (March 2003). In such case, the America is very likely to do the same to Iran. BIBILIOGRAPHY Dilip Hiro, War Without End. The Rise of Islamic Terrorist, and Global Response. New York, USA: Routledge, 2002 Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D.
Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington: D. C, 2005 Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, report by the Director General, GOV/2003/40 ,” June 6, 2003 (19 June 2003) L. W. Mc Naught, Nuclear Weapon and Their Effect, Royal Military College, Shrivenham, UK:1984. Saira Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions, Ashgate Publishing Company, USA: 1988 Zainuddin Djjafar. The Indonesia Quarterly in “Iran Nuclear Case. Implication US Stance and the Policy of Indonesia”.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Indonesia: 2006 Asian Middle East. http://www. globalissues. org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/iran/. Asian: 23 Feb 2007. Countries Overview Iran Nuclear Overview. htm. file://L:NTI 24 Feb 2007 www. iaea. org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n016. shtml#technical for the text of ELBaradei’s intervention. ——————————————– [ 1 ]. Jasjit Singh, “Revival Of Nuclear Power”, Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Vol 6 (6) May –Jul 2004 down loaded from website www. bharat –rakshak. com/MONITOR-6/singh. html 23 Feb 2007 (2300). [ 2 ].
The Indonesia Quarterly in “Iran Nuclear Case. Implication US Stance and the Policy of Indonesia,”. p 17 [ 3 ]. Dilip Hiro, War Without End. The Rise of Islamic Terroris and Global Response (New York, USA: Routledge, 2002), p 388 [ 4 ]. Ibid. p 389. [ 5 ]. Judith S Yaphe and Charles D Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran, pg 12. [ 6 ]. Ibid. p 13. [ 7 ]. Ibid. p 26. [ 8 ]. Ibid. p 27. [ 9 ]. Ibid. p 28. [ 10 ]. Ibid. p 32. [ 11 ]. Ibid. p 33. [ 12 ]. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, report by the Director General, GOV/2003/40 ,” June 6, 2003 (19 June 2003) [ 13 ]. ww. iaea. org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n016. shtml#technical for the text of ELBaradei’s intervention. [ 14 ]. Natural uranium is a source material, not special fissionable material It is not used in a nuclear explosive because in its natural state it is not fissile. The IAEA acknowledge that large quantities of source material have the potential to be significant for weapon if they are processed and therefore has developed the concept of “effective kilo” 1800 kg of natural uranium is equivalent of 0. 18 effective kilo.