Introduction
1. The Durand Line is a 2,450 kilometer ( 1,519 stat mi ) boundary line between Afghanistan and Pakistan runing from the goad of the Sarikol scope in the North, to the Persian boundary line to the south-west [ 1 ] . It is named after Sir Mortimer Durand, who in 1893, as a representative of the British-Indian authorities, had negotiated and concluded an understanding in Kabul with the swayer of Afghanistan [ 2 ] .When Pakistan came into being in 1947, the Afghan authorities was speedy to reject the Durand Line as the International boundary line between the two states because it divided the Pashtun tribes that inhabit the part on both sides of the Pak-Afghan boundary line. Therefore, Afghanistan laid claim to the larger Pashto-speaking countries that fall within Pakistan ‘s North-West Frontier and Balochistan states. Pakistan refused to entertain the idea of yielding any district, and, therefore, steadfastly rejected the thought, take a firm standing that the Durand Line must stay and be recognized as the international boundary line between the two states. Hence, the position of the Durand Line has remained a changeless political clash throughout the history of Af-Pak dealingss.
2. The inquiry arises, so, why the Afghans are invariably seeking to turn out the invalidness of the Durand Line. In other words, “ Why do they desire to kill the Durand Line? ” or “ Why has Durand line become such a rancid issue for the Pashtun ‘s? ” These inquiries besides lead us to my hypothesis that instability in the Pak- Afghan boundary line part lies in the historical contentions and aberrances environing the Pathan divide which originated from the act of pulling of Durand line.The statement made here is that the chief cause of instability in this part is an unnatural division made between the Pathan community which has led to Afghanistan ‘s ill will towards Pakistan and the laters attempt to convey instability in the part to stamp down the Pashtunistan demand or redrawing of the boundary lines.
Afghanistan as a State State
3. In the center of 18th century, the military and political mastermind of Ahmad Shah Durrani ( 1747-73 ) created an Afghan province in the signifier of a tribal Confederacy that was, for the first clip, a distinguishable political entity in cardinal Asia, and a clearly recognizable primogenitor of present twenty-four hours Afghanistan [ 3 ] ( Refer fig 1 ) . Harmonizing to Olivier Roy, the existent laminitis of the modern province of Afghanistan is by and large accepted to be Amir Abdur Rehman Khan ( 1880-1901 ) , and the province was given stableness by foreign imperialism [ 4 ] . At this clip, the British were set uping themselves steadfastly, throughout significant parts of India [ 5 ] . During the first one-fourth of the nineteenth century, while the British consolidated their power in India, Tsarist Russia expanded the Map demoing Ahmad Shah Durrani ‘s Empire district under its control to the South by repressing and annexing cardinal Asiatic lands and northern parts of Persia. Russia ‘s steady progresss created anxiousness in Great Britain for the safety of its Indian imperium [ 6 ] .
4. The Russian involvements in cardinal Asia kicked off in the 1830s, at which clip it considered Afghanistan to be a portion of cardinal Asia. Afghanistan separated the two great imperiums of the clip and perceiving and moving itself as being a buffer province, it became a nation-state [ 7 ] .
The “ Great Game ” and Carving of Northern Frontiers of Afghanistan
5. From the beginning of 19th Century the British and the Russians started demoing involvement in Afghanistan. The “ Great Game ” started when Persia, with Russian aid attempted to take over Herat during Dost Mohammad ‘s regulation ( 1835-63 ) [ 8 ] . The British actively sought to maintain Afghanistan as an inhospitable path to any progressing ground forcess. The Afghan swayers, from Amir Abdur Rehman onward, considered the policy of maintaining their state unaccessible as the best method of maintaining powerful neighbors at arm ‘s length [ 9 ] . After the first Anglo – Afghan war, active dialogues were carried out between the Russian and the British authoritiess sing Afghanistan [ 10 ] .In 1873, the Russians accepted Afghanistan ‘s new northern frontiers as following the class of the Oxus River from the Pamir, and so south-west to the Persian boundary line so as to include Afghani territory- i.e. , Balkh, Maimanah and Heart [ 11 ] ( Refer fig 2 ) .
Northern and Western boundary lines of Afghanistan and Wakhan Corridor.
6. Subsequently, when the British occupied Quetta in 1876, Russians made progresss into Afghanistan. They sent a diplomatic mission to seek a common aid pact with the Afghans against the British. This was accepted reluctantly by the Amir. The British besides sent a mission to the Amir, holding similar aims. But this clip the Amir did non give a response instantly. This led to 2nd Anglo-Afghan War [ 12 ] , which resulted in the Treaty of Gandamak [ 13 ] on May 26, 1879. By this pact, for the first clip Afghanistan was deprived of its traditional character of being a buffer province, its Amir going a virtually a feudal province of the British Crown [ 14 ] . However, the Gandamak program failed to accomplish peace in the part, and the forward policy was adopted ; i.e. , travel frontward into Afghan district, addition control, and make a buffer province to protect India [ 15 ] .Tensions between the British and the Russians continued in Europe, and besides had an impact on cardinal Asia. The state of affairs subsequently improved as a consequence of dialogues between the Russian and the British authoritiess, and by 1887, Afghanistan ‘s northern boundary was laid steadfastly along the Oxus River. Afghanistan besides agreed to make a land corridor between the British Indian district in north-eastern Afghanistan and Russia. This became known as the “ Wakhan Corridor ” [ 16 ] ( Refer fig 2 ) .
7. Necessity to Draw Southern Border of AfghanistanWith the determination as to the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, Russia insisted that the British should pull a line and to organize southern boundaries of Afghanistan beyond which British should non progress. The demand to stabilise the British India boundary line with Afghanistan besides arose, as Afghanistan was internally weak due to political instability and dealingss of Amir Abdur Rehman ( 1880-1901 ) with the British Government of India were besides acquiring strained [ 17 ] .
The Durand Line Agreement
8. To settle the southern boundary inquiry, the Amir of Afghanistan asked the Government of British India to direct a mission and on October 2, 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand ( the Foreign Secretary of India ) took a mission to Kabul. After blunt dialogues and treatments, an understanding was signed on November 12, 1893, which laid down a boundary for the alliance of the Durand Line [ 18 ] . It defined the southern and eastern bounds of the Amir ‘s rule, beyond which he volitionally renounced any claim. The Durand Line is sometimes referred to as the “ Zero Line ” . The complete text of the understanding is given in Appendix A.
Insufficiencies Of Word picture
9. The frontier, as described in the Durand Agreement was agreed to be marked jointly, by representatives from both authoritiess. Since the Amir was dying to finish the work of limit quickly, he suggested three different articulation committees to specify the frontier. The first committee was to work on the boundary near the caput of the Khyber Pass ; the second on the Kurram Valley and state instantly south of it ; and the 3rd one on the frontier which marched within the Balochistan Agency territories [ 19 ] .However, this limit could non be completed in Mohmand and Waziristan countries as desired. Therefore, the boundary had to be demarcated with boundary line pillars ( BPs ) where it did non follow natural characteristics ( Refer fig3 ) . Some BPs were constructed around unaccessible countries, therefore, the boundary line became dilapidated over clip. But the residue still exists at certain topographic points on the ridge lines. The insufficiencies in limit were the consequence of the followers: –
( a ) The Untimely Transfer of Sir Mortimer Durand.Sir Mortimer
The Durand Line Is Shown With Red Color
Durand, who was chiefly responsible for set uping the boundary line and possessed a wealth of experience of Afghan personal businesss, was transferred to Persia in 1894 while the hard stage of limit was to kick off [ 20 ] .
( B ) The Effects of Having No Survey and the Unavailability of Exact
Maps.The inaccessibility of a right transcript of the maps of the Durand Agreement had it ‘s consequence on the study. The existent study taken was unequal, because the Afghans refused to let any work to take topographic point, except that which was perfectly necessary for the word picture [ 21 ] .The trouble of limit was reinforced due to the geographical water parting, which coincided with tribal boundaries in few sectors. This was a outstanding job in the instance of Kunar and Kabul rivers [ 22 ] .
( degree Celsius ) Tribal Resentment. The major hurdle in the limit was the bitterness of the folks against the forward policy of British India, as the Pashtuns, the largest tribal grouping in the universe, were divided on the boundary line. The complex character of the Afghan people and the geographical milieus further complicated the procedure. For some folks this boundary was a thing so foreign to their mobile, independent life style of rolling in hunt of nutrient, shelter, household, tribal friends or game that pulling it merely served to put the boundary line ablaze with contention for the coming old ages [ 23 ] . The limit along the frontier of Waziristan and Mohmand could non be completed due to heavy armed bitterness in these countries [ 24 ] .
( vitamin D ) Political Expediency and Tribe Divide.The word picture by and large tried to follow tribal boundaries, e.g. , by dividing those folks which go to market to Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank and Quetta from those with economic links with Khurassan, i.e. , those holding Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar as their market towns [ 25 ] . However, the aspirations of most of the Pashtuns were non satisfied. Limit that are dictated by political expedience, instead than by scientific and societal consideration, tended to climax in an rebellion of the resentful folks ‘ inhabiting disputed country.
The Validity Of The Durand Line Agreement
10.International Rules.When the British Empire in India was split in 1947 into two independent provinces India and Pakistan the issue of the Durand Line became more sensitive. Pakistan succeeded to all the rights and all the international understandings and projects that the British Indian authorities of the part had entered into and inherited this understanding [ 26 ] .
11. Confirmation by SEATO and the United StatesThe international community accepts the Durand Line, in 1956 the SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting held at Karachi accepted the Durand Line as the internationally recognized boundary [ 27 ] . USA besides accepted the Durand Line as the international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan [ 28 ] .
Afghanistan ‘s Claims
12.Denouncing the Treaty.The Afghan authorities staged a complete “ about-face ” when the British authorities announced its house resolves to reassign its sovereignty over the sub-continent to its people [ 29 ] .They urged that Afghan territory up to the natural boundary line, the River Indus should be returned to Afghanistan [ 30 ] . A formal representation was consequently made to the authorities of undivided India, demanding the Restoration of a big country of the sub-continent on the land that, with the backdown of the British, the 1893 pact would sink automatically, thereby claiming that the boundary of Afghanistan in the E was that delimited by Ahmad Shah Durrani ‘s Empire in 1747-73.The authorities of British India rejected the cogency of the Afghan claim to the district E of the Durand Line.The most normally given ground for Afghan claims is that the Durand Line understanding was signed by Amir under duress. Afghanistan even caste a ballot against the admittance of Pakistan to the United Nations.
13. Dari Or Pashto Translation. The understanding that was signed by Abdul Rahman Khan was in English which he did non understand, therefore it leads to the intuition of counterfeit or false certification. The Dari or Pashto interlingual rendition of this papers or understanding has ne’er been signed by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan. Several other research workers have provided statements to the contrary that this papers was signed and has expired. The statement between Afghanistan and Pakistan Centres on this issue of cogency. But, the Government of Balochistan in expatriate challenges the “ legality ” of the Durand Line Agreement between Afghanistan and British India in 1893, non its “ cogency ” . They believe that the Durand Line Agreement is an illegal understanding, and and hence, it is void and null [ 31 ] . ( Refer fig 4 )
Map Published By The Advocates Of Greater Pashtunistan
14. Unilateral Cancellation of the Agreement.After strongly opposing Pakistan ‘s rank in the UN ab initio, Afghanistan subsequently accepted the new province on October 20, 1947. The Afghan parliament, in June 1949, proceeded to denote the one-sided cancellation of all the pacts that former Afghan authoritiess has signed with the British-India authorities, including the Durand Treaty, thereby proclaiming that the Afghan authorities does non acknowledge the Durand Line as a legal boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan [ 32 ] .Though this announcement was non acknowledged by the universe, the Durand Line has since been challenged by consecutive Afghans as illegal and arbitrary.
15. Termination of Agreement after Lapse of Hundred Years.As per the traditional Torahs the Durand Line understanding was to oversights after a hundred old ages of its sign language. This brought in another contention about the cogency of the understanding as after a life of hundred old ages it lost its legal standing in 1993. Therefore, it was justly demanded that countries of Pakistan be returned to Afghanistan, similar to how Hong Kong was returned to China [ 33 ] . But Pakistan stood house that neither the Durand understanding makes any reference of any clip period, nor is it validated under any international jurisprudence. Pakistan claims that the Durand line understanding therefore has no termination bound, and the reading of a 100 twelvemonth termination is merely traditional usage which restricts the cogency of the Durand Line understanding to the life-times of the Afghan swayers who ratified it [ 34 ] .
16. Free Movement Across The Durand Line.The understanding allows Afghan Pashtun tribes populating on both sides to travel across the line freely and as such they resolutely refused to acknowledge it. The Pashtuns are divided into more than 60 kins. In Pakistan, Pashto talkers are merely 8 per centum of the population of 145 million, which is otherwise dominated by Punjabis. In Afghanistan, Pashtuns are in bulk and of course rule Afghan personal businesss. Different sub-tribes have different beginnings, but they are united by linguistic communication, faith, and Pashtunwali codification of behavior that emphasizes honor, self-respect, unrelentingly seeking retribution when wronged, and warm, protective cordial reception. Under the protections of such like traditions, the people are working it for unofficial trade and smuggling activities under the pretense of authorised free motion [ 35 ] . It remains a fact that this boundary has ne’er been able to halt the free motion of people on either side. No Afghan government after 1893, even the Taliban, has ne’er accepted the cogency of the Durand Line.
PAKISTAN ‘S Base
17. Boundry.Pakistan ‘s boundary with Afghanistan is about 2,250 kilometres long. In the North, it runs along the ridges of the Hindu Kush ( intending Hindu Killer ) mountains and the Pamirs, where a narrow strip of Afghan district called the Wakhan Corridor extends between Pakistan and Tajikistan. [ 36 ] .
18. Pak Territorial Integrity. To keep its current territorial unity, it is in Pakistan ‘s involvement to hold a weak and destabilized authorities in Afghanistan so there is no 1 to dispute the genuineness of the Durand Line Agreement. It is by and large believed that Pakistani intelligence bureaus have provided shelter for members of Al-Qaeda and Taliban who are perpetrating Acts of the Apostless of terrorist act within Afghanistan to destabilise the democratically elective authorities of President Hamid Karzai. However, in the current position it may be inaccurate to take a firm stand on the inviolability of any frontier, including the Durand Line.
19. Pakistan ‘s Attempt to Regain Influence. Islamabad is seeking to equilibrate its attempts to re-assert province control over countries on its side of the boundary line. The challenge for Pakistan is to recover influence in its western neighbour by resuscitating its contacts and therefore influence with the Afghan Taliban while turn overing back Talibanisation in its ain Pashtun countries. It ‘s attempts to neutralize FATA based domestic Rebels is focused on Taliban groups, whose support Pakistan needs to oppress the domestic insurgence and re-establish its influence in Afghanistan. While Pakistan ‘s Pashtun countries are most affected by Talibanisation, the phenomenon has made considerable inroads into Pakistan ‘s nucleus, where the Taliban, like the LeT/JuD, manifest themselves more as societal motion. This is why, in add-on to the pacification and counterterrorism run, Pakistan has besides begun concentrating on anti-extremism and de-radicalization attempts the ideological conflict which is designed to run out the swamp in which the Jihadists are able to turn and run [ 37 ] . A strong Pashtun dominated cardinal authorities in Kabul would destabilise Pakistan. This is why Pakistan nurtured and supported the Taliban who had a stronger Islamic instead than Pashtun individuality.
20.The Price Of Keeping The Line. The Pashtun inhabited border country with Afghanistan is governed by the Federally Administered Tribal Agency ( FATA ) , and is under the direct control of the cardinal authorities. Frontier ordinances stipulate that the kins could retain their ain legal order, with seniors ‘ councils and local Jirga ( tribunals ) . Above all, the ordinances allowed smuggling of arms and rinsing machines, drugs and telecasting sets to travel on. The Pakistan-Afghanistan understanding on transportation, which in world legalizes smuggling, is one of the agencies of commanding latent tribal irridentism but it costs Pakistan US $ 4 billion each twelvemonth in lost imposts This monolithic smuggling is one of the major grounds why Pakistan ‘s economic system is in such a shambles today. [ 38 ] An unstable Af-Pak boundary line is non a problem free proposition for Pakistan, while it may work in favour of Pakistan ‘s geopolitical involvements, it hurts the state ‘s economic system [ 39 ] .
21. Strategic Depth. Pakistan wants an Afghan authorities dominated by cultural Pashtuns that will supply it strategic depth both in its struggle with India and in keeping entree to Central Asian resources. This is why Pakistan trained and armed the Taliban, and continues to make so even after fall ining the USA in GWOT, therefore double uping the boundary line ambiguities into geopolitical additions. Pakistan had to prosecute a sub-imperial battle in Afghanistan to procure a client government, which would non merely give it a ‘strategic deepness ‘ against India but would besides assist brace its volatile Western boundary line. Islamabad came near to accomplishing this aim in 1996 when the pro-Pakistan Taliban seized control of Kabul and extended their power over two tierces of the state [ 40 ] . Pakistan pursued a proactive Afghan policy for two chief grounds. First, to continue Pakistan ‘s western boundary line and, 2nd, to supply `strategic deepness ‘ against India. The construct of the ‘strategic deepness ‘ was foremost articulated by the ground forces head General Mirza Aslam Beg and tried out in the high-profile Zarb-e-Momin military exercising in 1989-90. Simply put, the philosophy calls for a dispersion of Pakistan ‘s military assets in Afghanistan beyond the Durand Line and good beyond the current violative capablenesss of the Indian military. This would guarantee the protection of Pakistan ‘s military hardware in instance of belligerencies with India [ 41 ] .
Pashtunistan
22. Greater Pashtunistan.Afghanistan challenged the Durand Line following the proclamation of the divider program for the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent on June 3, 1947 [ 42 ] . Kabul laid claim to portion of northern countries where the Pashtuns live, and even non-Pashtun country of Balochistan. Strong feelings of Pashtun patriotism emanated
from Kabul, Pakistan could non last as a separate province therefore it started a counter propaganda against this demand of Pashtuns. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic province, but its demographic and political centre of gravitation is and has ever been Pashtun [ 43 ] . Indeed, Pakistan and Afghanistan about went to war in 1954 over the “ Greater Pashtunistan ” issue. This curious political human ecology explains why no Afghan authorities has of all time recognized the boundary line and why every Pakistani authorities has striven to act upon Afghan political relations off from ethnic-based Pashtun designation.
23. A 1958 Afghan stamp advancing “ Greater Pashtunistan Day ” [ recognition: ] Vast Numberss of Afghans believe that Pakistan is intentionally undermining Afghanistan and Pashtun job in peculiar. Consequently, Afghan leaders have repeatedly found it impossible to discourse the boundary line due to immense public passion. Pakistan, besides a multi-ethnic province, frights that farther taking apart ( East Pakistan split off to go Bangladesh in 1971 ) might spell the terminal of the Pakistani province wholly. Provincial liberty for Pashtuns of Afghanistan was the chief demand of the Afghan Government wholly along the Durand Line contention. It ‘s besides notable to indicate out that the Pashtuns have more in common with Pakistanis than they do with the other ethnicities of Afghanistan: Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc. This once more is a complicated affair since Pakistan is organised along by and large cultural lines while Afghanistan is organised on assorted lines, the Afghan states being size of Pakistani territories. However, the fact is Afghanistan ne’er showed willingness to let its ain Pashtun bulk parts to fall in an independent Pashtunistan. The rise of Taliban was partially due to Pushtun defeats. It was the historic phenomenon of coming together of Paushtun tribesmen at the clip of crisis. Pushtuns of different dispositions either openly supported or approved of them this created an ‘artificial integrity among Paushtuns’ [ 44 ] .
24. Anti Punjabi Domination. The Pashtunistan motion in Pakistan is against the Punjabi domination [ 45 ] . The dissatisfaction focuses on the function of Punjabi civil retainers in the provincial disposal and on Islamabad ‘s opposition to the usage of the Pashtu linguistic communication as the medium of direction in instruction. The cardinal political job confronting Pakistan is how to cover with the deep cultural tensenesss between the Punjabi bulk, which controls the armed forces, and Baluchi, Sindhi and Pashtun minorities that have been denied a just portion of economic and political power [ 46 ] .
26. Pak Role to Stifle Pashtun Impulses. Pakistan has worked single-mindedly to smother Pashtun urges for an independent Pashtunistan both during and after the Soviet business of Afghanistan. When the Soviet forces left, the ISI ab initio sought to put in Afghan alternates considered to be opposed to the Pashtunistan construct. When these groups proved unable to consolidate their power, Islamabad turned to the Taliban, who had a Pashtun base but were dominated by clerical leaders with a pan-Islamic political orientation who had no old designation with the Pashtunistan motion. Significantly, nevertheless, when the Taliban came to power they did non play to the melodies of Islamabad and did non recognize the Durand Line despite Pakistani force per unit areas to make so [ 47 ] . In malice of the endemic struggle among different Pashtun groups, the impression of the cultural and cultural integrity of all Pashtuns has long been familiar to them as a symbolic composite of great possible for political integrity. [ 48 ] The radicalisation of the Pashtun countries straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary line has intensified both Islamist fanaticism and Pashtun patriotism. In the conventional wisdom, one or the other, either Islamist or Pashtun individuality, will finally prevail, but an every bit plausible possibility is that the consequence could be an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’ [ 49 ] . In recent old ages, whenever the Durand issue has been raised, the disposal of Afghan President Karzai has avoided remark, favoring a declaration of the issue through parliament. President Hamid Karzai, in an interview to Radio Liberty, has said that “ The Afghan state, and non Hamid Karzai, would hold to make up one’s mind the issue of Durand Line. ” In this mode, Afghanistan successfully avoids reigniting a historical struggle with Pakistan, while keep backing credence of the Durand Line as a valid international boundary line.
[ 1 ] Yousaf, Brig Mohammad and Addin, Maj Mak, The Bear Trap.Jang Publishers, Lahore.1992.pp24,37. [ 2 ] Nation maestro Encyclopaedia online. & lt ; hypertext transfer protocol: //www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Durand-Line-html & gt ; . [ 3 ] Ahmed Shah Abdalli ( Durrani ) was a Pashtun Chief who seized power in Kandahar in 1747 and carved a land with certain elements of coherence to organize modern Afghanistan. [ 4 ] Amir is the rubric for leader in the rAA©sistance, some one who has civil and military power. It was replaced by “ King ” in 1929. Griffiths, JC. Afghanistan. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger,1967, Chap 5. [ 5 ] Roy, Olivier. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd Edition 1990, pp13-15. [ 6 ] Senzil, Nawid. “ The State, the Clergy and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during 19th Century and early twentieth Century ” . International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No 4,1997. pp 581-605. [ 7 ] Fraser, W.K. Tytler. Afghanistan: A Study of Political Devlopments in Central Asia. Oxford University Press, London,1950, Chap IV, pp75-81. [ 8 ] Kirk, Peter Hop. The Great Game.New York: Kodansha America Inc, 1990. [ 9 ] Khan, Ijaz, “ Afghanistan: A Geopolitical Study, ” Central Asian Survey, Vol 17, no.3,1998. pp 489-502. [ 10 ] Singhal, D.P. , India and Afghanistan. Melbourne: Wilkes & A ; Co. Limited. , 1963, p10. [ 11 ] Khalid, Zulfiquar. Pakistan in the Pamir Knot. Vanguard books ltd.Lahore.1987.pp 40-48. [ 12 ] Fraser, W.K. Tytler. Op.cit. , pp151-180. [ 13 ] Gandamak, is a small town of Afghanistan, 35 stat mis from Jalalabad on the route to Kabul.& lt ; hypertext transfer protocol: //www.1911encyclopedia.org/g/ga/gandamak.htm & gt ; .
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