Prior to diging into the elaborate history and developments of the Danish industrial dealingss system, it is of import to briefly derive an overview of more general of import facts and figures about the state. Denmark has a population of about 5.5 million people and the GDP growing rate was 2.4 % between 2004 and 2007 ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . In 2008, the unemployment rate reached, with 3.1 % , its lowest degree in the 2nd one-fourth of the several twelvemonth ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Even if due to the world-wide fiscal crisis, the unemployment rate rose up to 5.5 % in April 2009, the unemployment rate in Denmark has been really low, throughout the recent old ages, compared to other European states ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Despite recessionary inclinations in the past old ages caused by the universe economic crisis, the Danish economic system is stable and healthy ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) . Compared to other European states, Danish rewards are comparatively high ; nevertheless in Denmark employers about do non pay any welfare pension or other part and therefore, entire labor costs are on the same degree as the EU norm ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) . Working clip is fixed at 37 hours a hebdomad, which is amongst the lowest compared to the European norm ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) .
Next, the most of import societal histrions in the Danish economic system are introduced ; these are trade brotherhoods and employer administrations. Traditionally, Denmark had a high grade of trade brotherhood rank every bit good as a multiplicity of different trade brotherhoods. However, harmonizing to Jorgensen, ( 2009a ) , the figure of trade brotherhood members has been in diminution steadily since 1996. From 2004 to 2008, trade brotherhood denseness fell from about 80 % to 69 % ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Most of the Danish trade brotherhoods are associated to one of the three chief trade brotherhood alliances, viz. Landsorganisationen I Danmark ( LO ) , Akademikernes Centralorganisation ( AC ) and Funktionoerernes og Tjenestemoendenes Foellesrad ( FTF ) ( Gill, Gnudsen, Lind, 1997 ) . With 1.22 million members in 2009, LO is the largest and most of import trade brotherhood alliance in Denmark ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Traditionally, LO was closely linked to the Social Democratic Party of Denmark and financially supported the party. Since 2003 nevertheless, in response to increased unfavorable judgment of “ forced parts ” by brotherhood members, LO officially put an terminal to the tight relationship ( Gill et al. 1997, Scheuer, 2007 ) . Its 24 attached brotherhoods are chiefly trades and general brotherhoods, which organise chiefly skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers from the private and public sector ( Gill et al. , 1997, Scheuer, 1998 ) . However, in the last decennaries at that place has been a diminution in LO rank and the alliance has lost some of its influence in corporate bargaining ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . The 2nd largest trade brotherhood alliance, with about 360,000 members in 2009, is FTF which is a politically independent alliance that comprises industrial brotherhoods, which organise chiefly white collar professionals, like school instructors, nurses and constabularies officers from the populace sector ( Jorgensen, 2009a ; Gill et al. , 1997, Scheuer, 1998 ) . Ranking 3rd is the brotherhood alliance AC, besides politically independent, with about 130,000 members in 2009. Its associated brotherhoods are mainly brotherhoods which organise professionals with an academic instruction both in the private and public sector ( Jorgensen, 2009a ; Gill et al. , 1997, Scheuer, 1998 ) . Even though some competition exists between the three chief trade brotherhood alliances, the overall relationship between them is comparatively good ( European Trade Union Institute, 2009a ) .
Compared to other European states, Denmark ‘s denseness of employer administrations is rather high ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . More than 80 % of Denmark ‘s work force is working for a company which is a member of an employer administration ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . The largest and most influential employer administration is the “ Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening ” ( DA ) ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . The employer administrations “ Finanssektorens Arbejdsgiverforening ” ( FA ) from the fiscal sector and “ Sammenslutningen af Landbrugets Arbejdsgivere ” ( SALA ) from the agricultural sector are the 2nd and 3rd most of import administrations ( Gill et al. , 1997 ) . However, DA covers more than six times every bit many employees as the other two administrations together ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Today, DA represents 13 associated employer administrations and is active within five industries of the private sector ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . With approximately 60 % of rank, “ Dansk Industri ” ( DI ) , is the largest member administration of DA and has absolute determination power ( Jorgensen, 2009a ; Gill et al. 1997 ) .
These two societal histrions play a important function in the Danish industrial dealingss system. The beginning of Denmark ‘s industrial dealingss system can be traced back to the so called “ September Compromise ” of 1899 ( Scheuer, 1998 ) . In the 1890s, struggles between employers and workers in Denmark intensified and were accompanied by monolithic work stoppages and lockouts ( Jorgensen, 1999 ) . The sign language of the “ September Compromise ” in 1899, ended the “ Hundred Days ‘ War ” , an industrial difference between the Employer ‘s Association DA and the Union Confederation LO and established a model of industrial dealingss ( Jorgensen, 1999 ) . This Compromise introduced a corporate bargaining system that benefitted both parties and its chief rules are still valid today ( Jorgensen, 1999 ) . Besides the corporate bargaining system, two other major results of the “ September Compromise ” were achieved: on the one manus, the peace duty prohibits work stoppages and lockouts while corporate understandings are in force, and on the other manus both parties accepted that the other party has the right to form ( Scheuer, 1998 ) . In the undermentioned old ages, the institutional bargaining system was enhanced through the execution of Industrial Courts, public arbiters and proceedings for renegotiation of run outing understandings ( Scheuer, 1998, Jorgensen, 1999 ) . Furthermore, the system was incorporated into the legal system ( Scheuer, 1998 ) .
Today ‘s industrial dealingss system – the “ Danish Model ” – is based on these historical developments. This theoretical account is characterized by a high degree of centralised corporate bargaining and minimum statute law refering the labor market ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . This means that indispensable labor market concerns like working hours, rewards, minimal rewards and working conditions such as sickness wage, pregnancy leave and preparations are non regulated by the Danish authorities but jointly agreed on between representatives of employees and employers ( Jorgensen, 2009a, Petersen, 1997 ) . In Denmark the coverage rate of corporate understandings is, with 83 % in 2008, comparatively high compared to other European states ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . The corporate understandings arranged between employers associations and trade brotherhoods are adhering and misdemeanors can be brought to industrial tribunal ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) .
The “ Danish Model ” has several alone features, in peculiar the constructs of “ decentralized centralization ” and “ flexicurity ” virtue farther description. One of the chief characteristics of the Danish collective bargaining system is that dialogues take topographic point on several degrees. Model understandings are settled on national degree via dialogues between LO and DA and have longer cogency than sectoral degree understandings ( Jorgensen, 2009a ; ETUI, 2009b ) . As respects framework understandings on national degree, the alleged ‘general understanding ‘ is the most of import one as it defines, amongst others, the right to organize, the peace duty and the rights on dismissal ( Jorgensen, 2009a ; ETUI, 2009b ) . Under model understandings, more elaborate understandings refering wage, working conditions and working hours so go on at industry degree between the several trade brotherhoods and employer administrations ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . These industry degree understandings in bend, lay the footing for dialogues between direction and employee representatives at company degree ( ETUI, 2009b ) . This relationship between the national, sectoral and company degree is frequently referred to as “ centralized decentralization ” ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) .
As stated by Scheuer ( 1998 ) , another property of the “ Danish Model ” is its public assistance system, which is characterised by a high degree of unemployment benefits instead than occupation protection. This combination of flexibleness and security is frequently referred to as “ flexicurity ” . With the outgrowth of brotherhoods, associated Unemployment Insurance Funds ( UIFs ) have been created which are managed by the several brotherhoods, but are financed by the province. As merely brotherhood members could profit from the UIFs, the alleged “ Ghent system ” has frequently been criticised as a state-financed enlisting tool of the brotherhoods since no unemployment wage could be received from the authorities if a individual was non portion of a UIF. To cut down unemployment and the fiscal load of the UIF on the province, reforms were introduced in the 1980s, which increased the fiscal part of employees and employers and freezed the degree of unemployment benefits ( Scheuer, 1998 ) . In add-on to UIF, Danish brotherhoods provide their members with services, such as vocational preparation and labour exchange ( Scheuer, 1998 ) . These services may besides explicate the high grade of trade brotherhood rank every bit good as the phenomena that Danish trade brotherhoods experience high enlisting in times of high unemployment ( Scheuer, 1998 ) .
The overall advantage of the “ Danish Model ‘s ” corporate bargaining system is that it is more flexible than statute law and therefore understandings can be adapted to altering environments and demands more quickly ( Scheuer, 1998 ) . In add-on, due to the before mentioned peace duty, industrial action in Denmark is comparatively low compared to other European states ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) .
However, harmonizing to Scheuer ( 1998 ) there are besides disadvantages of the “ Danish Model ” . First, non all employees of the private sector are employed under a corporate understanding and hence do non bask the rights and protection arranged in the understandings. Second, despite the comparatively low degree of industrial action, the colony of new understandings when old understandings are run outing is frequently ambitious and accompanied by work stoppages and lock-outs as the peace duty is merely applicable when understandings are in force. However, if a common consent can non be found, the Danish parliament has the power to stop the struggle and put up a new corporate understanding ( Scheuer, 1998 ) .
The “ Danish Model ” has been confronting several menaces disputing its being in recent old ages. After Denmark had entered the European Union, the demands for permuting EU Directives into the national labor market – and the arising inquiries of whether to implement them via corporate bargaining or statute law – posed challenges on the traditional Danish system of industrial dealingss ( Jorgensen, 2009a, Scheuer, 1998 ) . Finally, Denmark managed to use its well-established corporate bargaining system supported by statute law ( in order to include even those employees non covered by model understandings ) to present most of the relevant EU Directives. Furthermore, since the 1990s, the tendency towards a decentalisation of corporate bargaining posed yet another challenge to the traditional system ( Scheuer, 1998 ) . Corporate bargaining of general footings and conditions has now been shifted from the national and multi-industry bargaining degree to a single-industry bargaining attack ; likewise, wage bargaining has been transferred from national and industry-wide bargaining to individual workplace bargaining ( Scheuer, 1998 ) .
In order to truly derive a full image of the state ‘s industrial dealingss system, it is besides important to briefly explore some of the peculiar characteristics of the Danish human resource direction ( HRM ) system. Danish civilization has been determining employment dealingss and the human resource direction attack of the state. For illustration, compared to other European states, few caputs of HRM sit on the Board of Directors in Denmark. This could bespeak a comparatively low importance and engagement of HR issues in the strategic planning of a company ( Brewster, Mayrhofer, Morley, 2004 ) . However, this decision might be deceptive, as the low engagement of HR on the Board of Directors can be explained by two particular characteristics of the Danish labor market. First, it is characterised by a low grade of hierarchal construction and power distance, which means that the caput of HRM can still hold a high influence on strategic be aftering even though he or she is non sitting on the Board of Directors ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) . Second, the Danish labor market is dominated by little and average sized endeavors ( SMEs ) which are in general lupus erythematosus structured and formalised than big corporations and therefore finding the influence of HR by its representation on the Board of Directors might non be an appropriate step ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) .
As antecedently mentioned, traditionally, in Denmark rewards have been determined by corporate understandings on industry degrees. However, harmonizing to Brewster et Al. ( 2004 ) , in recent old ages, there has been an addition of companies that apply single performance-based wage systems, which could bespeak a lessening of brotherhood influence. In fact, this tendency could besides reflect that first, more and more employees demand wages harmonizing to their competency and single public presentation and 2nd, there is a closer cooperation between brotherhoods and HRM.
The general tendency of company enlargement and growing during the late 1890ss fostered a alteration in Danish enlisting forms for managerial forces from internal enlisting mechanisms to external 1s ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) . As stated by Brewster et Al. ( 2004 ) , in the employee choice procedure, Danish companies most often use mention cheques, application signifiers, psychometric testing and one-to-one interviews. Appraisal Centres are comparatively seldom used as a method for choice in Denmark. Due to the high cost deductions, Assessment Centres are frequently merely used by transnational companies, which are merely sparsely represented in the Danish economic system ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) .
Refering employee engagement and representation, the Danish mono workplace representation construction assigns the duty to stand for employees at the workplace to the trade brotherhoods ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Cooperation commissions can be set up in companies using more than 35 employees and are the chief channels of employee representation at workplace degree ( ETUI, 2009c ) . Even though there are some basic differences, cooperation commissions can be compared to work councils which are someway likewise. One cardinal difference is for illustration that the cooperation commission has merely information and audience rights but non veto rights like work councils have ( ETUI, 2009c ) . Furthermore, the commission consists of an equal figure of trade brotherhood representatives every bit good as of company direction ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . Cooperation commissions are besides used to settle corporate understandings refering, among other things, human resource policies, usage of personal informations and equal intervention of work forces and adult females ( ETUI, 2009c ) .
As outlined by ETUI ( 2009d ) , Denmark has a two-tier board construction for public limited companies ; private limited companies can take between one-tier or two-tier board. Employees of Danish companies using more than 35 employees have the right to elect a certain figure of representatives to the Board of Directors which have the same rights and responsibilities as the other members of the board. Employee representatives on the board are comparatively seldom found in little companies but often in big companies, as merely 12 % of companies with less than 100 employees have a representative on the Board of Directors but 81 % of companies using more than 500 employees have representatives ( ETUI, 2009d ) .
As there is merely small statute law refering employee fiscal engagement, Denmark lags behind most other European states in the field of fiscal engagement strategies and employee ‘ profit-sharing ( ETUI, 2009e ) .
Having established the nucleus features and historic development of both Denmark ‘s industrial dealingss and human resource direction systems, several recent tendencies are analysed in the balance of this paper. The first interesting tendency in the Danish system is the gender wage spread. Despite their equal or even higher educational degree and makings, adult females tend to be paid less than work forces all across Europe ( Larsen, 2007 ) . Harmonizing to Larsen ( 2007 ) , Denmark is, with approximately 17 % in 2007, even among those states with the highest gender wage spread in Europe. This wage spread contradicts with the fact that Denmark has one of the highest female employment rates in Europe and that Danish adult females are compared to adult females in other European states among those with the highest educational makings ( Larsen, 2007 ) . This contradiction may be ascribed to different causes. On the one manus, adult females are still underrepresented in corporate Boardss of Directors every bit good as in top direction places ( Larsen, 2007, Jorgensen, Pedersen, 2010 ) . On the other manus, adult females are chiefly working in those industries where rewards are typically comparatively low, like the wellness attention and child instruction sectors ( Jorgensen, Pedersen, 2010 ) . The Danish authorities and societal histrions are progressively concentrating on this issue ; nevertheless their current enterprises seem non to turn to the wage spread straight ( Jorgensen, Pedersen, 2010 ) .
The 2nd recent tendency is the phenomenon of work-sharing. As a manner to avoid mass redundancies ensuing from the universe economic crisis, the usage of work-sharing has grown enormously in Denmark during the last two old ages ( Jorgensen, 2009b ) . Harmonizing to Jorgensen ( 2009b ) , the figure of companies utilizing work-sharing has risen from 27 in 2007 to 500 in the first two months of 2009. The rule footings and conditions for work-sharing are determined by corporate understandings ; the period without work is regulated by jurisprudence and the unemployment benefits are financed by the Danish province. These already bing regulations are nevertheless non flexible plenty and therefore, driven by the urgency of the economic crisis and the increasing force per unit area of the societal histrions and companies, the authorities introduced enterprises to further work-sharing. Even though most of these enterprises are appreciated by the societal histrions and companies the latter criticise that the steps are non extremist plenty and that merely important alterations of the work-sharing regulations could better the state of affairs and safeguard the labour market from monolithic redundancies and the companies from closings ( Jorgensen, 2009b ) .
Even though these comparatively recent tendencies are of import issues in Denmark, they do non straight endanger the Danish industrial dealingss system as such. The lessening in trade brotherhood rank as observed during the last decennaries, on the contrary, could present a menace to the continued being of the “ Danish Model ” . Therefore, the undermentioned subdivision will take a closer expression at the alterations in trade brotherhood rank and purposes at analyzing the causes and effects of this development to the Danish industrial dealingss system.
As mentioned before, compared to other European states, Denmark has a comparatively high trade brotherhood denseness and a reasonably low degree of competition among the different trade brotherhoods due to traditionally rigorous limits between the different professions and sectors ( Scheuer, 2007 ) . Harmonizing to Lind ( 2007 ) , this high trade brotherhood rank was chiefly owed to the particular unemployment strategy in Denmark, called the “ Ghent system ” . In this system, the unemployment insurance is non compulsory like in many other European states. Employees who want to hold unemployment insurance have to fall in the UIF. The liberalization of statute law refering the enlisting of members by UIFs in the beginning of the 21st century allowed for the outgrowth of non-union controlled UIFs ( Lind, 2007 ) . Since so, rank in UIFs is no longer tied to merchandise brotherhood rank and therefore Acts of the Apostless as a possible subscriber to decreased trade brotherhood rank figures. Trade brotherhood rank reached its extremum with approximately 82.7 % in 1995 ( Mailand, 2006 ) . Since so, rank rates easy but bit by bit declined and go on to worsen in Denmark ( see Table 1 ) . In 2009, this diminution reached 69 % ( Jorgensen, 2009a ) . However, this diminution is non merely due to the before mentioned restructuring of the UIFs ; harmonizing to Scheuer ( 2007 ) , this diminution is instead due to an addition in the entire figure of employed people than to an aggregative diminution in trade brotherhood rank: while the Danish work force augmented by 136,000 employees, aggregate brotherhood rank decreased by 50,000 ( Scheuer, 2007 ) .
Over recent old ages, a displacement in trade brotherhood denseness among the Danish trade brotherhood alliances can be observed. Chiefly trade brotherhoods organised by the alliance LO are enduring from worsening rank figures. Since the extremum in 1995, trade brotherhood rank of the largest Danish trade brotherhood alliance, viz. LO, has been steadily worsening ( Mailand, 2006 ) . While the trade brotherhoods affiliated to LO demonstrated a entire rank of about 1.5 million active members in 1995, they merely organised about 1.22 million members in 2009 ( Jorgensen, 2010a, Scheuer, 2007 ) . The other two chief trade brotherhood alliances ( AC and FTF ) , every bit good as independent “ xanthous ” trade brotherhoods, on the contrary, have achieved to increase their rank rates somewhat ( Mailand, 2006 ) . Harmonizing to Scheuer ( 2007 ) , this development mirrors two chief tendencies in Denmark. First, the competition from the alleged “ xanthous ” brotherhoods has increased ; these brotherhoods chiefly lure away members from LO ( Scheuer, 2007 ) . “ Yellow ” brotherhoods are trade brotherhoods that are non portion of the traditional trade brotherhood motion and which operate independent of the big brotherhood alliances ( Jorgensen, 2005, 2010b ) . Even though the “ xanthous ” brotherhoods can non present corporate understandings to their members, their rank rates are steadily increasing, which is chiefly due to low rank fees which particularly attract employees with low incomes and therefore chiefly LO members. In 2005, the 13 “ xanthous ” trade brotherhoods together organised about 150,000 active members and therefore bing the size of AC. The most of import “ xanthous ” brotherhood is the alleged “ Christian Trade Union Movement ” ( Kristelig Fagbev?gelse, Krifa ) ( Jorgensen, 2005, 2010b ) . The 2nd account for the displacement trade brotherhood rank is the fact that the educational degree of the Danish work force has risen over the past old ages. The addition in the figure of people with university grades entails a lessening in the figure of those workers that would traditionally be organised in LO, the brotherhood for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. This besides explains the addition in rank rates of the brotherhood alliances AC and FTF, which chiefly organise higher skilled employees. To antagonize the migration of members from the traditional to the “ xanthous ” trade brotherhoods, the president of the largest trade brotherhood affiliated to LO, viz. the “ United Federation of Danish Workers ” ( Fagligt Faelles Forbund, 3F ) , Mr Skov Christensen proposed a amalgamation of all trade brotherhoods organised by LO to one big LO-union ( Jorgensen, 2010a ) . In this manner, so Christensen, the new big trade brotherhood could profit from economic systems of graduated table and therefore vie with the low rank fees of “ xanthous ” brotherhoods ( Jorgensen, 2010a ) . This is non the lone advantage of one big trade brotherhood. Traditionally the limit of the bing trade brotherhoods was based on occupational classs, but this system does no longer suit today ‘s labour market. Harmonizing to Jorgensen ( 2010a ) , the labor market in Denmark has become more flexible. Employees tend to alter their occupations more frequently than in the yesteryear. Additionally, they do non merely change their occupation but they besides progressively change across industries and types of occupations. One big brotherhood, without distinguishable limits between businesss and sectors would therefore be more flexible to manage this new manner of labour market without ‘requiring ‘ people to alter brotherhood rank when exchanging occupations or industries ( Jorgensen, 2010a ) . Furthermore, one united trade brotherhood would debar LO internal struggles between the different trade brotherhoods and therefore beef up LO to the exterior ( Jorgensen, 2010a ) .
Another ground for the diminution in trade brotherhood rank among the trade brotherhoods affiliated to LO is the ripening of bing members and the low degree of enlisting of new members, particularly immature people who do non seek rank themselves ( Jorgensen, 2010b ) . An account for this low degree of enlisting of immature employees might be the displacement organize a former leftist toward a more individualist labor market civilization. This tendency is reflected in the increased decentralization of corporate bargaining, where the company degree progressively additions importance over broader understandings, every bit good as in the increased employee demand for single and public presentation based intervention ( Brewster et al. , 2004 ) . As a effect to antagonize this tendency, peculiarly big LO-affiliated trade brotherhoods such as the “ Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees in Denmark ” ( Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund, HK ) and 3F are really actively seeking to enroll new members by enlisting and advertizement runs ( Jorgensen, 2010b ) .
One might believe that the diminution in brotherhood rank of LO-affiliated brotherhoods is merely a job for LO. However, this tendency within this most of import Danish brotherhood could take to major alterations in the full collective bargaining system and even go a menace to the “ Danish Model ” as a whole. As already mentioned before, the rule corporate understandings are set between the most powerful trade brotherhood alliance, LO and the most influential employer administration, DA. At the minute, LO still is the most powerful trade brotherhood alliance and there is no power instability between the two bargaining parties ( Mailand, 2006 ) . However, if LO continues to bit by bit loose power and influence through the diminution in rank, this might endanger the “ Danish Model ” of corporate bargaining. One could reason that finally one of the other trade brotherhood alliances might take over the function of LO. However, it is non every bit easy as this as the other two chief alliances, FTF and AC are – as already mentioned before – , with about 360,000 and 130,000 members severally in 2009, by far non every bit powerful as LO, which despite worsening rank still has about 1.22 million members, and therefore there would be a power instability favoring the employer administration DA. FTF and AC, despite little additions in rank, are besides non likely to derive significantly more members in the hereafter as tendencies indicate that the bulk of migrating members from LO are non fall ining the other large and traditional trade brotherhood alliances such as AC or FTF but either they are non fall ining a brotherhood at all or they choose a “ xanthous ” brotherhood. This is reflected in the increased rank figures of the 13 trade brotherhoods runing outside the traditional three alliances ( Jorgensen, 2005 ) .
In amount, there are legion causes for the diminution in trade brotherhood rank of the LO-affiliated trade brotherhoods. Many of these are complex and interlinked issues and therefore hard to undertake. As this tendency has been steadily go oning since the mid of 1990s, it is really likely that Oklahoman or subsequently, LO will lose its influence in the corporate bargaining system at some point in the hereafter. It is questionable if the other trade brotherhood alliances will be able to equilibrate this loss. This development could in the long-run have dramatic effects for the “ Danish Model ” – and even the Danish society as a whole – due to the emerging instabilities of the two major societal histrions. One solution to this quandary might be, as suggested by the president of LO, Hans Jensen, a close cooperation between the three chief trade brotherhood alliances LO, FTF and AC ( Mailand, 2006 ) . To safeguard the “ Danish Model ” it might even be a possibility to hold a amalgamation between these three big trade brotherhood alliances in order to keep the balance of power between trade brotherhoods and employer associations.
As there is presently merely small to no statute law refering the labor market in Denmark, a death of the corporate bargaining system or even merely an instability in power proportions between trade brotherhoods and employer administrations would trip cardinal alterations in the operation and interactions of the Danish economic system and society.
