Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance

Introduction:

Theforces that give rise in demand of information revelation in modern capital market stems from the information dissymmetry and bureau struggles bing between the direction and the shareholders. Therefore, the solution to bureau struggles lies in the ownership construction and the map of board of managers.

( Jensen and Meckling 1976 ) found that the Ownership construction is assessed by the proportion of portions held by directors and blockholders.So managerial ownership which is ( the proportion of portions held by the CEO and executive managers ) and blockholder ownership which is ( the proportion of ordinary portions held by significant stockholders ) are two major administration mechanisms that help command bureau job. In add-on, [ Fama 1980 ] argues that the board of managers is the cardinal internal control mechanism for monitoring directors.

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Fiscal coverage and revelation are of import resources for direction to pass on houses ‘ public presentation and success of efficient capital market ( ECM ) .Fama ( 1991 ) defined ECM as a market in which new information is accurately and rapidly reflected in portion monetary values.

The inducement to voluntarily uncover information still under involvement to both analytical and the empirical researchers.Analytical research concerned and verified issues as how competition affects revelation, ( Darrough and Stoughton 1990 ) . Empirical research workers documented the influence of house features like size, purchase, listing and managerial ownership on revelation.

Firms provide revelation by fiscal statements, direction treatment and analysis, footers, moreover some houses involved in voluntary supply such as cyberspace sites, imperativeness releases, conference calls, direction prognosiss.

Corporate revelation is proxied by an aggregative discloser mark of one-year study, including background information, sum-up of historical consequences, non fiscal statistics, projected information and direction determination and analyses. ( Botosan 1997 ] ) and ( Endg and Mak 2003 ) .

Voluntary revelation is measured by the sum and item of non compulsory information that is contained in the direction determination and analyses in the one-year study.

Research job:

Corporate administration mechanism that is good practiced could profit stockholder financially by exerting more control in the companies ‘ direction. Furthermore, the corporate administration feature can be seen as placeholders for mugwumps and the alliance of involvement between direction and the stockholder in minimising the bureau struggle.

Many researches have been done among different states to happen out which factors could lend to more revelation by companies in their fiscal one-year reports.Accordingly this research examines the impact of ownership construction, the profitableness and board composing on corporate revelation, in other words analyzing the relationship between corporate administration and voluntary revelation, because the revelation of information helps to cut down the cost of bureau jobs when there is an information dissymmetry between direction and stockholders.

The efficiency chitchat has been narrowed in the universe ‘s major economic systems but there remain of import chitchats in what we know. In peculiar, we lack a sufficient apprehension of the complicated ways in which the assorted corporate administration mechanisms interact with each other and with other features of houses and economic systems.

Research Questions:

  1. Is there any relationship betweenlevel of profitableness and the extent of voluntary revelation?
  2. Is there any relationship between managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary revelation?
  3. Is there any relationship betweenthe household member sitting on the board and the extent of voluntary revelation?

Research Aims:

The chief aim of this survey is to analyze whichamong the variables contribute to voluntary revelation and which attributes drive direction toward addition revelation degrees. Specifically, the aims of this survey are listed below:

  • To analyze whether degree of profitableness affect the extent of voluntary revelation of companies in Jordan.
  • To analyze whether managerial ownership construction affects the extent of voluntary revelation of companies in Jordan.
  • To analyze whether the household member sitting on the board affect the extent of voluntary revelation of companies in Jordan.

Significance of Survey:

There are many parties will acquire benefits from this survey, corporations, regulators, policy shapers, the analytical, andempirical researches.This research will better their apprehension on which corporate administration factors affect the extant of voluntary revelation and will increase their information about this country via supplying extra grounds on corporate administration and revelation.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since separation of ownership and control is the prevailing signifier of corporate administration, old surveies have investigated the relationship between the corporate administration mechanisms and house ‘s revelation behaviours. Many different theoretical positions and research methods have been employed by a broad scope of research inquiries covering different states and clip periods. For illustration surveies have been done by Chow and Wong-Boren ( 1987 ) ; Penmann ( 1988 ) , Cooke ( 1991 ) , Hossain et Al. ( 1994 ) and Balachandran ( 2004 ) .

2.1 Corporate administration

The anterior survey references that the corporate administration refers to the manner companies are directed and controlled. A primary concern is the likeliness of a divergence in the aims of corporate directors from those of stockholders due to the bureau costs involved in supervising managerial behaviour ( Berle and Means 1932 ) .

Another survey besides mentions that the quality of corporate revelations is associated with corporate administration features. Harmonizing to Bujaki and McConomy ( 2002 ) , corporate administration has been described as “ the procedure and construction used to direct and pull off concern and personal businesss of the corporation with the aim of heightening stockholder value” . Corporate administration has besides been defined by the Finance Committee Report ( 1999 ) as “the mode in which house ‘s top officers are being monitored and discipline consequently with the nonsubjective ofenhancing stockholders value” . It is besides claimed that “Corporate administration is the procedure and construction used to direct and pull off the concern and personal businesss of the company towards heightening concern prosperity and corporate answerability with the ultimate aim of recognizing long term stockholder value” .

Dey ( 1994 ) stated that proper corporate administration system can assist guarantee an effectual division of authorization among stockholders, the board of managers, and the direction. Harmonizing to recent studies by Newby ( 2001 ) , investors are progressively establishing their investing determinations on companies ‘ corporate administration records and are willing to pay more for portions of well-governed companies compared to those of ill governed companies. This premium for well-governed companies is explained by the function of corporate administration in a company ‘s overall hazard direction scheme.

2.2 The bureau theory

Jensen & A ; Meckling ( 1976 ) in the bureau theory provides a model associating revelation behaviour to corporate administration. Corporate administration mechanisms are introduced to command the bureau job and guarantee that directors act in the involvements of stockholders. Theoretically, the impact of internal administration mechanisms on corporate revelations may be complementary or substitutive. If it is complementary, bureau theory predicts that a greater extent of revelations is expected since the acceptance of more administration mechanisms will beef up the internal control of companies.

Further, bureau theory provides a model for analysing fiscal describing inducement between directors and proprietors. Signing theory explains why houses have an inducement to describe voluntarily to the capital market even if there were no compulsory coverage demands, and voluntary revelation is necessary in order to come successfully in the market for hazard capital, the ability of the house to raise capital will be improved if the house has a good repute with regard to fiscal coverage.

2.3 Voluntary revelation

Penmann ( 1988 ) stated that fiscal revelation could be divided into compulsory and voluntary revelations. Compulsory revelation is defined as any fiscal point disclosed in companies one-year studies that are prescribed by accounting criterions and or the stock exchange ordinances. However, voluntary revelation is defined as any fiscal point or informations disclosed in one-year studies of companies that are non prescribed by the companies act and or accounting criterions, and, in add-on, for public-listed companies, the stock exchange ordinances. Further, Meek, Roberts & A ; Gray ( 1995 ) defined voluntary revelations as revelations in surplus of demands, stand foring free picks on the portion of company directions to supply accounting and other information that deemed relevant to the determination demands of users of one-year studies.

Many surveies have been carried out to explicate voluntary information revelation such as Chow and Wong-Boren ( 1987 ) ; Cooke ( 1991 ) Hossain et Al. ( 1994 ) and so away in their effort to find different degrees of revelations and the association between house ‘s features such as house ‘s size and industry type and the degrees of revelation.

In add-on, good coverage is expected to take down houses cost of capital because there is less uncertainness in houses that describing extensively and faithfully. Therefore, there is less investings hazard and lower required rate of return.

Harmonizing to Welker ( 1995 ) , directors are non likely to keep back information for their ain benefits under an intensive-monitoring environment, because this could take to betterment in revelation fullness and quality of fiscal statements. On the other manus, if the relationship is substitutive, companies will non supply more revelations for more administration mechanisms since one corporate administration mechanism may replace one another. If information dissymmetry in a house can be reduced because of the bing internal monitoring bundles, the demand for holding extra administration devices is considered smaller. These seemingly conflicting point of views on the impact of corporate administration have non been wholly resolved, in malice of this theoretical ambiguity.

Companies that perform good have a strong inducement to describe their operating consequences. Competitive force per unit areas would besides coerce companies to describe even though they did non hold good consequences. Silence of a failure to describe would be reinterpreted it as bad intelligence. Companies with bad intelligence would be motivated to describe their consequences in order to avoid being suspected of holding hapless consequence. Such a state of affairs would besides coerce bad intelligence houses to unwrap consequences in order to keep credibleness in the capital market.

2.4 The grounds for voluntary revelation

Management of companies provides voluntary points in their one-year studies because they perceived those points as of import to be disclosed. Management wants to give information to users through one-year studies in such a manner that they are capable of run intoing assorted demands of users for decision-making.

There are assorted user groups of one-year studies and each group has different perceptual experience sing the voluntary points. One group may comprehend point A as more of import than point B. These differing perceptual experiences among groups might be caused by different information demands to carry through their specific intents. Through one-year studies, users can obtain more houses ‘ information associating to their decision-making. Although there are many beginnings of information sing concern entity, an one-year study is considered the most of import and valued beginning of information Vergoosen ( 1993 ) .

With respect to grounds why companies unwrap voluntary points, theory suggests that many of the grounds why directions unwrap points voluntarily to users are centered on the demand to raise capital at the lowest possible cost ( Cooke 1989 ) . The undermentioned accounts may back up grounds why companies unwrap information voluntarily:

  1. Extra revelations may assist to pull new stockholders thereby assisting to keep a healthy demand for portions. Additional revelation by supplying more information relating to the present and future status of house ‘s wealth in order to construct an image that may bring forth good will for future benefits ( Iqbal et al 1997 )
  2. Increased information may help in cut downing informational hazard, which could take down the cost of capital.
  3. For the intent of raising capital on the market, companies may increase their voluntary revelation in one-year studies. Consequently, listed companies are more likely to hold a higher degree of revelation than unlisted companies
  4. Multiple listed companies frequently have an involvement in foreign capital markets since foreign operations are frequently financed by capital ( Choi & A ; Mueller 1992 ) . Disclosure degree might be increased to accommodate to local imposts to run into the demands of Bankss and other providers of capital.
  5. Listed and multiple listed companies might increase their societal duty revelation to show that they act responsibly ( Watts & A ; Zimerman 1979 ) . Companies may hold attained their position on the securities markets and are able to pull new stockholders for raising fund because they act responsibly ( Cooke 1989 )
  6. Under the capital markets minutess hypothesis, directors who plan on doing capital market minutess ( i.e. , publishing public debt or equity ) have inducements to supply voluntary revelations to cut down information dissymmetry between the directors and investors ( Healy and Palepu 1995 ) .
  7. Harmonizing to the judicial proceeding cost hypothesis, the menace of judicial proceeding can promote houses to increase voluntary revelation ( Skinner 1994 ) .

Table 1: Summary of old surveies analyzing

Firm features and the degree of voluntary revelation

Year of survey

Writer

State

Variables used

Consequence

1987

Chow and Wong – Boren

Mexico

Firm size, fiscal purchase, and assets in topographic point.

The extent of voluntary revelation is significantly related to steadfast size but non to tauten purchase and assets in topographic point.

1991

Cooke

Japan

Company size, Stock market listing, and industry types.

Size was the individual most of import variable in explicating fluctuation in voluntary revelation. Stock market listing was besides found to be a important forecaster, and fabrication houses were found to unwrap more information that other types.

1994

Hossain et Al.

Malaya

Firm size, ownership construction, foreign listing position, purchase, assets in topographic point, and size of audit house.

Firm size, ownership construction, foreign listing position is statistically related to the degree of information voluntarily disclosed by publically traded companies. In contrast, purchase, assets in topographic point and size of audit house do non look to be of import factors in explicating voluntary revelation by houses.

2001

Ho, Wong

Hong Kong

independent managers, voluntary audit commission, dominant personalities, household members on the board, voluntary revelation

The consequences indicate that the being of an audit commission is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary revelation, while the per centum of household members on the board is negatively related to the extent of voluntary revelation.

2004

Balachandran

Malaya

Voluntary revelation, CEO dichotomy and the proportion of independent managers on the board and on audit commissions

He found that CEO dichotomy is associated with lower degrees of voluntary corporate revelations. It was besides found a positive relationship between the proportion of independent non-executive managers on both the board and the audit commission to the extent of voluntary corporate revelation.

Chapter 3

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

3.0 Introduction

Upon bing academic literature several determiners explain why a house may supply more information voluntarily than compulsory. Different theories such as bureau theory, signaling theory, political cost theory, capital demands theory and so forth have besides been used to explicate those voluntary revelations

This chapter covers the theoretical model, the hypotheses, the theoretical account specification and measurings of variables, revelation index development and eventually this chapter presents the theoretical account of the survey.

3.1 Variables and model

3.1.1 Profitableness

( Foster 1986 ) suggests that profitable, will managed houses have inducements do separate themselves from less profitable houses in order to raise capital on the best available footings by supplying voluntary revelations. Directors are motivated to unwrap more elaborate information to back up the continuities of their places and wage. Therefore, more profitable houses can be expected to unwrap more voluntary information. ( Haniffa and cooke 2002 ) happen a positive and important association between the houses profitableness and the extent of voluntary discloser. This means that when there is addition in the profitableness the voluntary discloser of this house will increase. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

H1: there is a relationship between company ‘s profitableness and the extant of the voluntary revelation

3.1.2 Managerial ownership

( Jensen and Meckling 1976 ) reference that bureau theory argues that in a diffused ownership environment, houses will unwrap more information to cut down bureau costs and information dissymmetry. In a more concentrated ownership state of affairs, the impact on voluntary revelation is more complicated. The statement can be made in either way indicate that since directors pursue their ain involvement, higher direction shareholding would connote a larger sharing of the loss, and finally, a lower possibility that direction would take down corporate value.

Managerial ownership is the per centum of ordinary portions held by the CEO and executive managers, and includes their deemed involvements. When managerial ownership falls, outside stockholders will increase monitoring of director ‘s behaviour ( Jensen and Meckling 1976 ) . To cut down monitoring costs by outside stockholders, the director will supply voluntary revelation. Therefore, voluntary revelation is a replacement for monitoring.

In add-on, a survey by ( McKinnon and Dalimunthe 1993 ) found a important association between ownership construction in diversified Australian companies and voluntary section revelation. ( Hossain et al 1994 ) found that the degree of revelation of Malayan companies is reciprocally related to the per centum of portions held by the 10 most of import stockholders. Further, empirical grounds shows that managerial ownership is negatively related to revelation ( Ruland, Tung and George 1990 ) . Hence it is expected that voluntary revelation additions with lessenings in managerial ownership. Therefore it is hypothesized that:

H2: There is a relationship between managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary revelations.

3.1.3 Family member on the board

When members of the board own a big figure of portions and at the same clip they are relations from one household or a figure of households, this may impact the fiscal revelation pattern of the house. ( Haniffa and Cooke 2002 ) in their survey reported that the per centum of household ownership in any house may act upon the revelation pattern of the house. It has been suggested that in states where certain households have equity retentions there should be a small physical separation between those who own and those who manage the capital.

( Ho and Wong 2001 ) reference that, the household control phenomenon is still in being presents. However, it is still non clear to what extent the alone corporate ownership construction would impact the effectivity of other supervising devices such as audit commission, independent non-executive managers and CEO dichotomy in finding a house ‘s fiscal revelation. Further, they stress that in a family-controlled house, members of the commanding household would straight take part in the day-to-day direction of the house by naming themselves as executives and board managers. It is besides assumed that every household member owns and votes its portions jointly. In theory, there are possible struggles between the commanding and non commanding stockholders of a house due to the formers leaning to pull out private benefits through their engagement in the house and other insider traffics.

( Nicholls and Ahmed 1994 ) argued that capital proprietors do non hold to trust wholly on voluntary revelation to the populace to supervise their investings because they have greater entree to internal information instead than the general populace and stakeholders. This decision and findings are based on the thought that since members on the board have more information than external users this will negatively impact the extent of voluntary revelation. This means that when the household ownership is big the voluntary revelation of this house will be less.

It is assumed that companies with a household member sitting on the board are more likely to hold lower degree of voluntary revelation than otherwise. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

H3: There is relationship between the household member sitting on the board and the extent of voluntary revelation.

3.1.4 Control Variables

From a reappraisal of the anterior literature on voluntary revelation, it was decided to include three control variables in the arrested development theoretical account for proving the chief hypotheses. The control variables are steadfast size, purchase, and assets in topographic point.

First, Firm size ( SIZE ) : as a position of the association with higher degrees of revelation and house ‘s size, ( Firth 1978 ) who examined the impact of house size, stock market listing, and hearer ‘s presence on voluntary corporate revelation found that house ‘s size and stock market listing were positively associated with voluntary revelation. ( McNally et al 1982 ) found that the company ‘s size has important relationship with the degree of voluntary revelation points. ( Hossain et al 1994 ) found that house size and Ownership construction of foreign-listing position are statistically related to the degree of information voluntarily disclosed by publically traded companies.

Second, Assetss in topographic point ( AIP ) : In relation to assets in topographic point, ( Hossain and Mitraa 2004 ) in their survey analyze the assets-in-place in finding the degree of voluntary revelation of informations on foreign operations made by US transnational companies. The consequences indicate that assets-in-place influence the degree of voluntary revelation of informations of US transnational companies. In contrast, ( Chow and Wong-Boren 1987 ) examined the consequence of proportion of assets in topographic point on the voluntary revelation. The consequences have non demonstrated any convincing grounds of any relationships.

Third, Leverage ( LEVERAGE ) : the definition of purchase is the grade to which an investor or concern is using borrowed money. For companies, purchase is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, which is calculated by spliting entire debt by stockholders ‘ equity. The more entire debt there is, the greater the fiscal purchase and the greater the hazard of the company falling on its face. For investors, purchase means purchasing on border or utilizing derived functions such as options, to heighten return on value without increasing investing. Leveraged investment can be highly hazardous because you can lose non merely your money but the money you borrowed as good. Voluntary revelation of information refering debt fund may let stockholders and bondholders to do better anticipations about the growing, hazard and return chances of companies. Therefore, houses with higher purchase tend to unwrap more information than the lower 1s. ( Cadbury 1995 ) in his survey found that there was a positive association between purchase and the extent of voluntary section revelation among New Zealand houses.

3.1.5 Model

Sing all factors of the mugwumps and dependent variables, the theoretical account of the survey is depicted the undermentioned figure.

3.2 Measurement

Dependant variable

Definition

Measurement

DSCORE

Discloser mark

Entire figure of points awarded for voluntary discloser, strategic, non-financial and fiscal information ( coding one “1” if the company unwrap and Zero “0” otherwise )

Independent variables

Definition

Measurement

ROA

Profitableness

Tax return on Assetss

MOWN

Managerial ownership

The proportion of ordinary portions held by the CEO and executive managers ( spliting the managers portions on entire shared issued and to the full paid )

FMB

Family member in the board

Coding one ( 1 ) if there is household ownership and nothing ( 0 ) otherwise

Control variables

Size

Firm size

This variable is measured by the log ( basal 10 ) of entire assets

Lev

purchase

The ratio of entire debt of entire equity value of the house

AIP

Asset in topographic point

The ratio of net book value of fixed assets to entire assets

3.3 Disclosure Index

There is no in agreement theory on the figure and choice of points that should be included in a revelation index. ( Cooke and Wallace 1989 ) argued that the measuring of accounting revelation is a process that has some built-in restrictions and subjectiveness. To cut down the subjectiveness, the literature suggests that the undermentioned stairss should be taken into consideration when building the index ( see for illustration in Hossain et Al. 1994 ) .

* Review the old literature to pull a list of voluntary revelation points.

* Check that these points are non required by ordinances and extinguish or exclude any compulsory points.

* Refine the list and acquire the positions of faculty members and professionals on the points.

Disclosure degree can be measured in a figure of different ways. The normally used attack has been adopted utilizing a discretional point tonss “1” if it is disclosed, and “0” if it is non disclosed. This method of marking is known as the un-weighted attack based on the premise that each point of revelation is every bit of import. An un-weighted attack has been used in several anterior surveies like ( Wallace 1988 ) and ( Cooke 1989 ) in their survey employ un-weighted revelation index.

( Gul and Leung 2004 ) reported that the concluding revelation list contained 44 discretional points such as background information, fiscal public presentation information and non-financial public presentation information. The background information includes affairs that cover corporate ends, competition, merchandises and markets. On the other manus, public presentation information includes points such as alterations in gross revenues, gross net incomes and R & A ; D expenditures. Furthermore, Non-financial information includes figure of employees, and staff preparation and merchandises section analysis. For each point in the revelation index, the company receives a mark of ‘‘1 ” if it voluntarily discloses information on the point and ‘‘0 ” if otherwise.

Furthermore, In ( Balachandran 2004 ) survey, he measures the revelation mark index that comprises the consideration of 66 discretional points. He mentions that the survey used about 60 % of the discretional points as used in the antecedently elaborate surveies. Further, ( HO and WONG 2001 ) , in their survey measured besides the reported revelation by utilizing a comparative revelation index. It was derived by first roll uping a comprehensive list of voluntary revelation points that companies may supply in their one-year studies in Hong Kong. The index consists of entire 20 points of most of import that disclosed in one-year study.

However, in the present survey, the extent of voluntary revelation was measured by utilizing a revelation index which contains of points that disclosed in the one-year report.For each point in the revelation index, a company receives a mark of ‘‘1 ” if it is voluntarily disclosed information on the points and ‘‘0 ” for otherwise.

3.4 Data Collection

This research will utilize secondary informations obtained from the one-year studies of all the Jordanian companies.

3.5 Sample Selection

The sample for this thesis is all Jordanian companies which are listed on Amman Stock Exchange ; therefore the sample includes ninety three companies and covers the period 2002-2007.

3.6 Data Analysis:

3.6.1 The Descriptive Statistics

This descriptive survey produced the mean, lower limit, upper limit and standard divergence for each variable for Jordanian companies during 2002-2007.

3.6.2 The Correlation of variables

This survey shows how one variable is related to another. The consequences of this analysis represent the nature, way and important of the correlativity of the variables used in this survey and the correlativity between variables is analyzed by utilizing the individual correlativity.

3.6.3Model specification and multiple Arrested development

The multiple arrested development method is used to analyze the relationship between the Voluntary disclosurein Jordanian companies and Profitability, Managerial ownership and Family member on the board, the control variables are steadfast size, purchase, and assets in topographic point.

The consequence of arrested development analysis is an equation that represents the best anticipation of a dependent variable from several independent variables.

This method is used when independent variables are correlated with one another and with the dependant variable.

The undermentioned arrested development equation is estimated as follow:

DSCORE = b0 + b1MOWN + b2FMB + b3ROA + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 AIP + ?

Where:

b0: changeless

DSCORE: Discloser mark

ROA: Profitableness

MOWN: Managerial ownership

APQ: Asset in topographic point

Size: Firm size

Lev: purchase

FMB: Family member in the board

vitamin E: Error term

In this theoretical account, all independent variables enter the arrested development equation at one time to analyze the relation between the whole set of forecasters and the dependant variable.

The purpose of this analysis is to find which independent variables are extremely important to find the company ‘s profitableness.

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